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Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a), Plaintiff- Appellant Intermountain 
Sports, Inc., (hereinafter "Appellant"), by and through its counsel of record John Martinez 
and B. Ray Zoll, hereby submits the following Opening Brief: 
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The parties to this appeal are identified in the caption herein. Appellant's claims against 
Murray City were dismissed by stipulation and are not the subject of this appeal. (R. 281) 
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JURISDICTION 
This case was transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)(2002); the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over 
this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j)(2002), as an appeal from final judgment. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Inverse Condemnation Claim 
1. "Relevant Property" Issue: Did the trial court erroneously conclude that the relevant 
property for purposes of Appellants inverse condemnation claim is "access to property," 
rather than Appellant's "right as to use its land for the operation of a commercial business?" 
(R. 147-48; 11/10/03 HearingTr. p.23,11. 9-12, 17-20) 
Standard of Review: A grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings for failure 
to state a claim is reviewed as a question of law for correctness. No deference is given to the 
trial court. Factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom are 
accepted as true and are considered in a light most favorable to the Appellant. Affirmance 
is proper only if Appellant cannot prove any set of facts in support of its claims. Houghton 
v. Dept. of Health. 2002 UT 101, f 2, 57 P.3d 1067; Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 
P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). 
2. "Taking" Issue: Did the trial court erroneously conclude that Appellant did not state 
a "takings" claim, even though Appellant alleged two "takings" claims: (1) a "substantial 
interference" with the operation of its commercial enterprise which "destroyed or materially 
lessened its value" in excess of $2 Million; and (2) a "substantial interference" with the 
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operation of its commercial enterprise, whereby Appellant's right to the "use and enjoyment" 
of i ts c ommercial enterprise w as s ubstantially " abridged o r d estroyed" i n e xcess o f $ 2 
Million? (R. 148-50; 11/10/03 HearingTr. p.23,11. 12-14) 
Standard of Review: Question of law reviewed for correctness. No deference to trial 
court. Factual allegations and all reasonable inferences accepted as true and considered in 
light most favorable to Appellant. Affirmance proper only if Appellant cannot prove any set 
of facts in support of its claims. Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2002 UT 101, f2, 57 P.3d 
1067: Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). 
3. "Public Use" Issue: Although the trial court did not reach the issue, should this 
court hold for purposes of remand that UDOTs reconstruction of 1-15, causing the taking of 
Appellants right to use its land for operation of a commercial enterprise, was for a "public 
use?" (R. 150; 11/10/03 HearingTr. p. 23,11. 21-25, p.24,1.1) 
Standard of Review: Question of law reviewed for correctness. No deference to trial 
court. Factual allegations and all reasonable inferences accepted as true and considered in 
light most favorable to Appellant. Affirmance proper only if Appellant cannot prove any set 
of facts in support of its claims. Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2002 UT 101, f2, 57 P.3d 
1067; Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). 
4. "Harm" Issue: Did the trial court erroneously conclude that Appellant's loss of 
business resulting from UDOT's closure of the 45th South offramp for about 4 years during 
the 1-15 reconstruction—which the court characterized as a "temporary denial of access to 
property" which was not "permanent, continuous, or inevitably recurring"—was not 
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i 
compensable harm as a matter of law? (R. 150-51; 11/10/03 HearingTr. p.20,11.20-23, p.24, 
< 
Standard of Review: Question of law reviewed for correctness. No deference to trial 
court. Factual allegations and all reasonable inferences accepted as true and considered in 
light most favorable to Appellant. Affirmance proper only if Appellant cannot prove any set 
of facts in support of its claims. Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2002 UT 101, .f2, 57 P.3d 4 
1067; Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). 
5. "Causation" Issue: Did the trial court erroneously conclude that UDOTs closure of 
1 
the 45th South offramp for about 4 years during the 1-15 reconstruction did not "cause" 
Appellant's harm as a matter of law? (R. 151; 11/10/03 HearingTr. p.24,11. 4-12) 
Standard of Review: Question of law reviewed for correctness. No deference to trial 
court. Factual allegations and all reasonable inferences accepted as true and considered in 
light most favorable to Appellant. Affirmance proper only if Appellant cannot prove any set * 
of facts in support of its claims. Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2002 UT 101, f 2, 57 P.3d 
1067; Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). 
i 
B. Uniform Operation of Laws Claim 
1. Identity of "Law" Issue: Did the trial court erroneously conclude that the statutes 
from which UDOT draws its power to construct freeways and authorize UDOT to dictate the 
manner in which such construction will be performed are not "laws" applied non-uniformly 
byUDOT? (R. 152; 11/10/03 HearingTr. p.25,11.3-7) 4 
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Standard of Review: Question of law reviewed for correctness. No deference to trial 
court. Factual allegations and all reasonable inferences accepted as true and considered in 
light most favorable to Appellant. Affirmance proper only if Appellant cannot prove any set 
of facts in support of its claims. Houghton v. Dept. of Health. 2002 UT 101, ]29 57 P.3d 
1067: Colman v. Utah State Land Board 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). 
2. Identity of "class" Issue: Did the trial court erroneously conclude that Appellant's 
allegation that UDOT unlawfully discriminated against Appellant by arbitrarily and 
capriciously providing other businesses similarly situated to Appellant with accommodations 
not provided to Appellant did not allege membership in an identifiable class? (R. 152; 
11/10/03 HearingTr. p.24,11.24-25; p.25,11.1-2) 
Standard of Review: Question of law reviewed for correctness. No deference to trial 
court. Factual allegations and all reasonable inferences accepted as true and considered in 
light most favorable to Appellant. Affirmance proper only if Appellant cannot prove any set 
of facts in support of its claims. Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2002 UT 101,1f2, 57 P.3d 
1067; Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL 
UTAH CONST, ART. I, §22. 
Private Property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation. 
UTAH CONST, ART. I, §24. 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 72-6-101-119, inclusive. (Addendum Exhibit 1) 
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4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
< 
Nature of the case, course of proceedings, disposition in court below ^ 
For over 15 years Appellant worked hard to develop his Recreational Vehicle (RV) 
sales business in order to provide for his family and enjoy the fruits of his labors. Then over 
a period of 4 years, from 1997 through 2001, UDOT rebuilt the 1-15 freeway and effectively 
ran Appellant out of business. UDOTfs position is that the project "require[d] the breaking j 
of eggs," and that Appellant's loss of his livelihood is just too bad. (11/10/03 HearingTr. p.8, 
11.19-20) 
This case is about whether a jury should be given the opportunity to decide whether 
fairness and justice demand that the approximately $2 Million in losses suffered by Appellant 
as a result of the 1-15 reconstruction should be borne by the people of the State as a whole, ' 
rather than being left as a burden on Appellant alone. The trial court granted UDOT's motion 
for judgment on the pleadings and entered final judgment dismissing Appellant's claims as g 
a matter of law. (R. 286, Addendum Exhibit 2, p.2) 
Statement of Facts 
a. For over 15 years Appellant owned and operated an RV sales company on a parcel 
of land located at 4225 South 500 West in Murray, Utah, near the 4500 South offramp from 
the 1-15 freeway. (R. 2-3, Addendum Exhibit 3,1J8; 11/10/03 HearingTr. p.27,11. 4-20) * 
b. For about 4 years, from July 1997 to May 2001, UDOT conducted a massive 
reconstruction of the 1-15 freeway in order to benefit the people of Utah. (R. 5, Addendum J 
Exhibit 3,1fl[l9-22) 
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c. In July 1997, UDOT closed the 4500 South offramp adjacent to Appellant's RV 
business as part of the 1-15 reconstruction project. (R. 5, Addendum Exhibit 3, f 19) 
d. From July 1997 through December 1998—a period of VA years-access to 
Appellant's RV business was closed. (R. 5, Addendum Exhibit 3, ff 19-20) 
e. From January 1999 through May 2001-an additional period of about 2lA years-
UDOT placed periodic closures on traffic at the 4500 South Street offramp. (R. 5, Addendum 
Exhibit 3,121) 
f. Thus, from July 1997 until May 2001-a total period of nearly 4 years-UDOT 
effectively closed the 4500 South offramp, as well as the streets for East and West traffic 
adjacent to the 4500 South offramp. (R. 5, Addendum Exhibit 3, ^ [22) 
g. Instead of direct access off the 4500 South offramp, Appellant was left with a 
circuitous, 2.5-mile loop that snaked behind and around the area, thereby confusing, 
frustrating, and ultimately eliminating Appellant's potential customers. (R. 5-6, Addendum 
Exhibit 3, ^ 23) 
h. The net impact on Appellant from UDOT's I-15 reconstruction was that trafficflow 
on I-15 in the area of 4500 South Street dropped two-thirds from the traffic flow prior to such 
reconstruction, and the bulk of the remaining 1/3 of Appellant's potential customers ended 
up getting lost and never arriving at Appellant's RV business. (R. 6, Addendum Exhibit 3, 
1f24) 
i. As a direct result of UDOTs reconstruction of 1-15, Appellant suffered losses in 
excess of $2 Million. (R. 6, 9, Addendum Exhibit 3, ff25, 36, 37) 
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j . UDOT provided other similarly situated businesses in the area with accommodations 
i 
for direct access to 4500 South offramp traffic, and did not provide such accommodations 
to Appellant, thereby unlawfully discriminating against Appellant. (R. 6, 10, Addendum 
Exhibit 3 ,^26,39, 40) * 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
For over 15 years Appellant worked hard to develop his Recreational Vehicle (RV) ^ 
business in order to provide for his family and enjoy the fruits of his labors. Then over a 
period of 4 years, from 1997 through 2001, UDOT rebuilt the 1-15 freeway and effectively 
i 
ran Appellant out of business. UDOTs position is that the project tfrequire[d] the breaking 
of eggs," and that Appellants loss of his livelihood is just too bad. (11/10/03 HearingTr. p.8, 
11.19-20) -j * 
This case is about whether a jury should be given the opportunity to decide whether 
fairness and justice demand that the approximately $2 Million in losses suffered by Appellant , 
as a result of the 1-15 reconstruction should be borne by the people of the State as a whole, 
rather than being left as a burden on Appellant alone. Appellant is not seeking a windfall or 
to raid the public treasury. As is well established in the analogous area of city and county 
improvement districts, the jury may offset any special benefits conferred on Appellant from 
the special harm suffered by Appellant as a result of the 1-15 reconstruction. • 
Appellant asserts two constitutional claims against UDOT: Inverse Condemnation and 
Uniform Operation of Laws. On its Inverse Condemnation claim, Appellant makes 6 | 
contentions: (1) The relevant property is Appellant's "right to use its land for the operation 
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of a commercial business/1 not physical "access to property" as the trial court held. (2) 
Appellant properly stated two types of "takings," by alleging a "substantial interference" with 
the operation of its commercial enterprise which "destroyed or materially lessened its value" 
in excess of $2 Million, and by alleging a "substantial interference" with the operation of its 
commercial enterprise whereby Appellant's right to "use and enjoyment" of its commercial 
enterprise was substantially "abridged or destroyed" in excess of $2 Million. (3) UDOT's 
reconstruction of 1-15 caused a taking for a "public use" of Appellant's right to use its land 
for operation of a commercial enterprise. (4) Appellant's loss of business resulting from 
UDOT's closure of the 45th South offramp for about 4 years during the 1-15 reconstruction 
was legally cognizable "harm" which, if a jury so determines, is compensable. (5) UDOT's 
closure of the 45th South offramp for about 4 years during the 1-15 reconstruction "caused" 
Appellant's harm which, if a jury so determines, renders UDOT liable for the resulting harm. 
(6) A jury may offset any special benefits Appellant derived from the reconstruction project. 
On its Uniform Operation of Laws claim, Appellant makes 2 contentions: (1) The 
statutes from which UDOT draws its power to construct freeways and authorize UDOT to 
dictate the manner in which such construction will be performed are "laws" which were 
applied non-uniformly by UDOT, violating Appellant's right to Uniform Operation of Laws. 
(2) Appellant's allegation that UDOT unlawfully discriminated against Appellant by 
arbitrarily and capriciously providing other businesses similarly situated to Appellant with 
accommodations not provided to Appellant sufficiently alleges membership in an identifiable 
class for purposes of Appellant's Uniform Operation of Laws claim. 
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I 
ARGUMENT 
I 
I. INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIM: 
UDOT INVERSELY CONDEMNED APPELLANTS RIGHT TO USE 
ITS LAND FOR THE OPERATION OF A COMMERCIAL BUSINESS 
Introduction 
The Just Compensation Clause of the Utah Constitution provides: "Private property 
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." UTAH CONST, art. I, 
Sec. 22. Samuel R. Thurman, who introduced the Clause at the 1895 Constitutional 
Convention, set out most eloquently its importance in protecting private property from % 
governmental harm: 
"I believe that the right of property is a sacred right, and no matter if it is the widow's 
mite, I believe that the man who owns just one little ewe lamb has just as much right 
to that as the man has to his cattle that graze on a thousand hills...." 
[G]entlemen, this is a serious question we are dealing with. There is nothing more 
sacred than the right of property, unless it be the right to live and enjoy your liberty." | 
Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 336-37, 625-26 
(1898VAddendum Exhibit 4): see also id., 333 ("I don't believe there is a question to come 
4 
up before this Convention that will be of greater importance to it than the one that is being 
discussed right now.H)(William F. James). 
The Just Compensation Clause protects against two general types of "condemnations:" 
(1) "Direct condemnation," as when a private home that lies in the path of a proposed 
freeway is purchased "directly" by UDOT. There is no question that (A) "private property" | 
(the home), (B) a "taking" (expropriation of the home), and (C) a "public use" (freeway), are 
4 
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all present. In that setting, UDOT clearly is required to initiate a direct condemnation 
proceeding and pay fair market value to the owner. UTAH CODE ANN. § § 78-34-1 -78-34-20. 
(2) "Inverse condemnation," in contrast, occurs when private property is taken or 
damaged for public use without initiation of direct condemnation proceedings by the 
governmental entity doing the "taking or damaging." Thus, if UDOT were to build a freeway 
mistakenly believing it already had title to land which was actually owned by a private party, 
the owner could bring an inverse condemnation action to require UDOT to pay just 
compensation. Such an owner would be required to allege and prove: (A) a property interest, 
(B) had been taken or damaged (C) for public use. Farmers New World Life Insurance Co. 
v. Bountiful City. 803 P.2d 1241, 1243-44 (Utah 1990); for discussion of takings analysis, 
see 3 Sands, Libonati & Martinez, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, §§ 16.53.10-16.53.50; 
Martinez & Libonati, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, A Transactional Approach 312-
39 (2000). 
Inverse condemnation law in Utah has followed a tortuous path. The Utah Supreme 
Court initially held a claim could be brought directly under the Just Compensation Clause 
without implementing legislation. Webber v. Salt Lake City. 40 Utah 221,224,120 P. 503, 
504 (1911). The court later reversed itself, holding no such claim could be brought. 
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County. 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960). Then in 1990, the 
Court reversed itself again, holding such a claim can be brought. Colman v. Utah State Land 
Board, 795 P.2d 622, 630-34 (Utah 1990). Accordingly, constant resort to first principles is 
indispensable to keeping one's bearings in the field. 
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The foundational principle of inverse condemnation law is that "The tendency under 
I 
our system is too often to sacrifice the individual to the community." Stockdale v. Rio 
Grande Western Rv. Co.. 28 Utah 201, 203, 77 P. 849, 852 (1904). Like the analogous 
federal provision in the Fifth Amendment, the Utah Just Compensation Clause "was designed 
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." U.S. CONST. AMEND. V; | 
Armstrong v. United States. 364 U.S. 40,49 (I960). 
Appellant has the right under the Utah Constitution to have a jury decide whether 
i 
fairness and justice require that the costs Appellant suffered as a direct result of the 1-15 
reconstruction should be borne by the public, and not shouldered by Appellant alone. 
A. The relevant property is Appellant's "right to use its land for the operation of 
a commercial business," not physical "access to property" 
The trial court characterized Appellant's property as "convenient access to the 
freeway". (R. 291, Addendum Exhibit 2, p.7, f 17.) The trial court thereby misconceived the 
relevant property as physical access, rather than the legal right to use land. 
1. "Property" in the legal sense means legal rights 4 
"The word "property" although in common parlance applied to a tract of land or a 
chattel, to a physical thing, means in its legal signification only the rights of the owner 
in relation to it. Property is the right of any person to possess, use, enjoy and dispose 
of a thing. The term "property" is often used to indicate the res, or subject of the 
property rather than the property itself. " 
McGrew v. Industrial Commission. 96 Utah 203, 204, 85 P.2d 608, 610 (1938). See also 
I 
Colman 795 P.2d at 625 ("some protectible interest"). 
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The types of rights protected under Article I Section 22 are "practically unlimited.ff 
Farmers New World Life Insurance Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d at 1244, quoting Lund 
v. Salt Lake County. 58 Utah 546, 200 P. 510, 512 (1921). Inverse condemnation protects 
"every species of property . . . including legal and equitable rights of every description." 
Bagfordv.EphraimCitv. 904P.2d 1095,1098 (Utah 1995). 
2. The right to use land is a distinct protected right 
Appellant alleges it owns an RV sales company on a parcel of land located at 4225 
South 500 West in Murray, Utah. (R. 2-3, Addendum Exhibit 3, ffi[3, 8) The right to use land 
is a distinct and separate component in the bundle of rights we call "ownership." U.S. v. 
District Court, 121 Utah 18, 29,242 P.2d 774,779 (1952)(Wolfe,CJ., concurring in denial 
of petition for rehearing); see also Provo City Corp. v. Knudsen, 558 P.2d 1332,1334 (Utah 
1977)(right to use land affected by overflight easement on adjacent land must be "dealt with 
separately" and is separately compensable); Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall 
Consol. Mines Co.. 53 Utah 413, 174 P. 172 (1918)(right to use a tunnel). 
The drafters of the Utah Constitution clearly understood the significance of protecting 
the right to use land, and fully intended the Just Compensation Clause to cover it. See 
Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 326-27 (1898)(protection 
extends to circumstances "where an elevated road was erected upon a street and while it did 
not touch the property of the abutting owner, did not destroy a brick, did not take a foot of 
his ground, it did affect his use and occupation of his premises very disastrously.")(Charles 
S. Variant Addendum Exhibit 4): see also id., 328 ("I believe ... that when the public use a 
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man's property or make an improvement that virtually destroys the use of that property, that 
they should pay for it as much as if the property itself were taken.")(Franklin S. Richards). 
This court also has recognized the critical distinction between physical access and the 
right to use land. In Carpet Barn v. State, 786 P.2d 770 (Utah Ct App 1990), UDOT had 
tried unsuccessfully to buy a strip of land along the frontage of Carpet Barn's land in order 
to widen Redwood Road. Carpet Barn refused to sell, so UDOT widened the road without 
buying the strip of land. UDOT built a retaining wall which ranged from sixteen inches to 
two feet high, topped by a four-foot chain link fence, across the front of Carpet Barn's land. 
The finished project limited Carpet Barn's access to a twenty-foot wide driveway running 
from Redwood Road to the rear of Carpet Barn's facility, even though the minimum 
requirement for such driveways was twenty-five feet. The wall built by UDOT also prevented 
parking in front of the building, eliminating fifteen to twenty diagonal parking spaces. 
Finally, the footings built by UDOT encroached six inches onto Carpet Barn's land. This 
court held that "the State's construction of the wall extending along the legal right-of-way 
line deprived [Carpet Barn of its] long-standing right to utilize part of [its] property for 
store-front parking, thus entitling [it] to compensation for any decrease in value caused by 
the loss of parking spaces." Carpet Barn v. State. 786 P.2d at 774 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Three D Corporation v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321 (Utah Ct App 
1988) the City tried unsuccessfully to buy a part of Three D's land in order to widen the 
street. The City nevertheless extended the street surface to the existing legal boundary and 
built a solid curb along the length of Three D's land, where before there had been continuous 
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and accessible frontage along the street, thereby depriving Three D of most of its former 
parking spaces. This court held Three D was entitled to compensation because the City had 
"substantially impaired [Three D's] long-standing right to utilize [its] property for store-front 
parking and [had caused Three D] direct, peculiar injury" and consequent devaluation of its 
commercial property. Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d at 1326. 
And as recently as April 29, 2004, this court once again held that the right to use is 
a distinct, constitutionally-protected property right. In Diamond B-Y Ranches v. Tooele 
County, 2004 UT App 135, the County refused Diamond a conditional use permit to operate 
a gravel pit because of neighbors1 opposition. Diamond alleged that its economically viable 
use had been "taken" under the federal and state Just Compensation Clauses. The County 
argued Diamond had no protected property right in the issuance of a conditional use permit. 
Rejecting that contention, this court held that Diamond had stated a takings claim if all—or 
only some—of its beneficial uses had been deprived, and that "Diamond's constitutionally 
protected property interest... is the beneficial use of its property in general."Id. at 1fl[14,18. 
And in The View Condominium Owners Ass'n v. MSICO. L.L.C.. 2004 UT App 104, 
497 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, this court also recently held that the right to use is a distinct property 
right entitled to constitutional protection—even if interference with such use is of limited 
duration. Sorenson Resources Company was developing 25 acres in the Town of Alta. The 
View Condo Owners Association ("The View") bought lot 8, and Alta approved its 
development, but on condition that lot 9, still owned by Sorenson, was designated as a snow 
storage site for lot 8. Afterward, MSICO bought lot 9, then sued Alta, seeking to free lot 9 
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from t he b urden o f T he V iewfs s now s tor age use r ight. A lta s ettled w ith M SICO, a nd 
purported to remove the burden on lot 9. Alta also threatened to prohibit "occupancy of The 
View or portions thereof during snow periods." Id., f 9. The View then sued Alta for an 
unconstitutional "taking" of The View's snow storage use right appurtenant to lot 8. First, this 
court held there was "no dispute as to The View's property interest in the continued use and 
development of Lot 8," and that "the protectible property interest at the heart of the takings % 
claim is the interest that The View asserts in Lot 8 itself." Id, T{36 n.3. Moreover, this court-
also held that if proved at trial, the prohibition against occupancy of some or all of The View 
i 
condos would be constitutionally compensable. Id, [^36, 
UDOT similarly deprived Appellant of the right to use its land for operation of a 
commercial enterprise. Appellant properly alleged a constitutionally protected property right 
and is entitled to have a jury determine the compensable harm thereby caused. 
The trial court misconstrued Appellant's claim as one for deprivation of physical j 
access. By focusing on physical access rather than on the legal right to use land, the trial 
court made the same mistake as UDOT in Carpet Bam, and the City in Three D. The 
i 
gravamen of Appellant's complaint is not that its physical access has been impaired, but 
rather that UDOT has substantially impaired Appellant's right to use its land for the operation 
of a business, and has caused Appellant direct, peculiar injury and consequent devaluation 
of its commercial property. Caipet Bam v. State. 786 P.2d at 773-74; Three D Corporation 
v. Salt Lake City. 752 P.2d at 1326. < 
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B. Appellant properly alleged two types of "takings": "substantial interference" 
with the operation of its commercial enterprise which "destroyed or materially 
lessened its value" in excess of $2 Million, and "substantial interference" with 
the operation of its commercial enterprise whereby Appellant's right to "use and 
enjoyment" of its commercial enterprise was substantially "abridged or 
destroyed" in excess of $2 Million 
The trial court held Appellant had not properly alleged a takings claim because 
"temporary denial of access to property does not constitute a taking.ff (R. 290, Addendum 
Exhibit 2, p.6, Tf 16) The trial court thereby compounded its erroneous characterization of the 
relevant property as physical access, (addressed in Part LA, above), with a misconception 
about what is a sufficient allegation of a taking under the Utah Just Compensation Clause. 
Article I Section 22 prohibits "takings'1 of private property for public use without 
payment of just compensation. UTAH CONST, ART. I, §22. A "taking" is "any substantial 
interference with private property which destroys or materially lessens its value, or by which 
the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed." 
Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d at 626 (citations omitted). Appellant alleged: 
"f 18. After reconstruction of 1-15 began, traffic flow on 1-15, in the area of 4500 
South Street, dropped two thirds from the traffic flow figures prior to the 
Reconstruction Project. 
1fl9. In July 1997, UDOT began reconstruction on I-15 [a]ffecting4500 SouthStreet, 
by closing the off-ramp to the Affected Property 
f 20. Access to the Affected Property was closed until December 1998, a period of 18 
months instead of the 12 months promised by UDOT in its construction contract. 
TJ21. The City and UDOT placed periodic closures on traffic at the 4500 South Street 
off-ramp over the following 2 1/2 years. 
Tf22. The State and City were effectively closing access to freeway exits and 
entrances, as well as access for East and West traffic at the 4500 South Street off-
ramp, from July 1997 until May 2001, nearly a period of four years. 
T[23. The access provided by Defendants, in lieu of direct access off the 4500 South 
off-ramp, involved a circuitous 2.5-mile loop... behind the Affected Property, which 
frustrated and eliminated potential customers. The Circuitous Loop was impractical 
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4 
and unreasonable for purposes of bringing prospective customers from the freeway 
to Plaintiffs business. Not only was the critical line of sight lost, but also the route * 
was lengthy and confusing. 
^24. Upon information and belief, the already significantly diminished number of 
potential customers from drive-by traffic, now 1/3 of what it was prior to re-
construction, ended up getting lost and never arriving at Intermountain. 
f25. The closure of the off-ramp, coupled with the change in configuration, denied 
reasonable access to the Affected Property and substantially damaged the value of 
Plaintiffs property in an amount to be proven at trial but currently calculated to be in 
excess of $2,000,000.00. 
TJ26. The City constructed the Circuitous Loop in such a manner that other businesses M 
obtained direct access to 4500 South off-ramp traffic, who otherwise benefitted from 
the loss to Intermountain. 
f 27. Such action by the Defendants became tantamount to a taking of the property for 
the good of others and at the expense of Intermountain without just compensation. 
f 31 — Defendants took or impaired Plaintiffs substantial property right for a public 
use without just compensation." 
(R. 5-7, 8, Addendum Exhibit 3, ffi[ 18-27, 31) 
Appellant thereby alleged two types of "takings: (1) a "substantial interference" with 
the operation of its commercial enterprise which "destroyed or materially lessened its value" 
in excess of $2 Million; and (2) a "substantial interference" with the operation of its 
commercial enterprise by which Appellant's right to the "use and enjoyment" of its 
commercial enterprise was substantially "abridged or destroyed" in excess of $2 Million. I 
First, the trial court erred by not applying the proper standard for motions for 
judgment on the pleadings-and then it went on to mis-read Appellant's complaint as alleging 
merely a temporary denial of physical access. The court should have accepted all factual 
allegations and all reasonable inferences therefrom as true, and should have denied UDOTfs 
motion. Houghton v. Dept. of Health. 2002 UT 101, ^ [2,57 P.3d 1067; Colman v. Utah State 
Land Board. 795 P.2d 622. 624 (Utah 1990V 
i 
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Second, the trial court erred by relying on Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989), in which the closing of North Temple to re-route 
floodwaters caused loss of business to abutting commercial enterprises. Reliance on that case 
was inappropriate on several grounds: (1) In Rocky Mountain, plaintiffs merely alleged 
interference with physical access, not interference with the right to use. Id. at 464-65. In fact, 
the Supreme Court in Rocky Mountain cited favorably to this court's Three D decision, 
discussed in Part LA. above, which made that critical distinction. Id. Appellant here, in 
contrast, claims recompense for the taking of the right to use. (2) The plaintiffs in Rocky 
Mountain did not allege, and therefore the court did not consider, a narrow characterization 
of the relevant property. By comparison, in Colman, the court upheld the narrow 
characterization of the relevant property as 300 feet of the 5-mile long canal. Thus, it is up 
to the claimant to properly allege a narrow definition of the relevant property—whether 
physically defined as in Colman, or conceptually defined as the right to use, as Appellant 
alleged here. (3) In Rocky Mountain, the city responded to an emergency; the city had to act 
quickly to save plaintiffs and the public from imminent flooding damage. See Colman v. 
Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 628-29 (Utah 1990)(distinguishing "emergency" 
cases). In contrast, UDOT here was engaged in highway reconstruction that was years in the 
planning and execution. (4) In Rocky Mountain, plaintiffs' harm was mitigated by the fact 
that the city blocked off physical access only for 6 months. In contrast, UDOT interfered with 
Appellant's right to use its land for 4 years. (5) Rocky Mountain is fundamentally suspect 
because it relied on Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100,349 P.2d 157 (1960), 
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i 
which held that Art. I, §22 was not self-executing, a determination expressly overruled by 
I 
Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622,632 (Utah 1990). (6) Rocky Mountain also 
is suspect because it relied on Bailey Service & Supply Corp. v. State Road Commission, 533 
P.2d 882 (Utah 1975), in which the court held that if construction occurred entirely on public 
property, no taking could occur. In Colman, which involved the state's breach of a causeway 
owned by a public utility (railroad) to reduce the level of the Great Salt Lake, the Supreme 4 
Court overruled that foundation for Bailey Service. 
C. UDOT's reconstruction of 1-15 caused a taking for a "public use" of Appellant's 
right to use its land for operation of a commercial enterprise I 
The trial court concluded Appellant had no constitutionally protected property right 
and that there was no "taking," so it did not determine whether the taking alleged was for a 
I 
"public use." Since it will be an issue on remand, however, this court should address it. 
Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure-Rite. Inc.. 2001 UT App 347, ^26, 37 P.3d 1202 (court 
4 
has duty to pass on issues that may become material on remand). 
A "public use" for purposes of a "taking" claim is one which "will promote the public 
interest, and which use tends to develop the great natural resources of the commonwealth." I 
Nash v.Clark, 27 Utah 158,75 P. 371 (1904)(irrigation ditches): see also Highland Boy Gold 
Min. Co. v. Strickley. 28 Utah 215, 78 P. 296 (1904)(roads and tramways for mining 
industry); cf. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff. 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984)("public use" is 
coterminous with police powers). In Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 
i 
1990), the Court equated "public use" with "legitimate governmental objectives," such as 
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A governmental taking incident to reconstruction of freeways is a "public use." UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§72-5-103(1 )(UDOT authority to "acquire any real property or interests in real 
property necessary for temporary, present, or reasonable future state transportation purposes 
by gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemnation, or otherwise."); 78-34-
l(6)(acquisition of property for roads is "public use"); 78-34-3(6)(all classes of private 
property may be taken for public use). Appellant properly alleged that the taking of its 
property resulted from UDOT's reconstruction of I-15. (R. 5-7,8, Addendum Exhibit 3, Iff 18-
27, 32 ("...Defendants1 [conduct] was based on a public purpose to expand 1-15 to reduce 
traffic impediments and safety concerns along 1-15...")) 
D. Appellant's loss of business resulting from UDOTs closure of the 45th South 
offramp for about 4 years during the 1-15 reconstruction was legally cognizable 
"harm" which, if a jury so determines, is compensable 
Appellant alleged business loss as the harm caused by UDOT. (R. 6, 9, Addendum 
Exhibit 3, ffl[25, 37) The trial court concluded as a matter of law that Appellant's loss of 
business was not compensable harm. See (R. 290, Addendum Exhibit 2, p.6, f 16) 
First, the trial court again erred by not applying the proper standard for motions for 
judgment on the pleadings; it should have accepted all factual allegations and all reasonable 
inferences therefrom as true and denied UDOTs motion. Houghton v. Dept. of Health. 2002 
UT 101, «p, 57 P.3d 1067; Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 
1990); c£, The View Condominium Owners Ass'n v. MSICO. L.L.C.. 2004 UT App at f 36 
(summary judgment reversed; whether taking occurred is question of material fact). 
Second, the trial court erred as a matter of substantive law. The drafters of the Utah 
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Constitution intended that a jury determine whether the state has imposed compensable 
"harm/1 See Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 327 (1898)(ff...the 
means of arriving at the estimate are within the knowledge of men and can be adduced before 
a jury.M)(Lorin Farr)(Addendum Exhibit 4). Thus, the question of harm should have been left 
to ajury. 
This court has recently noted that federal Just Compensation law may be instructive 
in t he d evelopment o f U tah J ust C ompensation 1 aw, D iamond B -Y R anches v. T ooele 
County, 2004 UT App 135, |14 n.2. The United States Supreme Court has held that apartial 
taking may be compensable, so that even if land has not been deprived of aU economically 
beneficial use, an analysis of several factors can be used to determine whether an interference 
is so great that compensation nevertheless is required. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 
U.S. 606, 617 (2001)(MThe economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, 
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations... [and] the character of the governmental action" are factors considered in the 
latter kind of cases, citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 
(1978)). The United States Supreme Court also has upheld ajury trial of federal takings 
claims. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.. 526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
Accordingly, the trial court on remand could instruct the jury pursuant to the Penn Central 
factors for determining the takings question. 
Third, it appears that the trial court confused Appellant's property right to use its land 
to run a lawful business, with the measure of recovery for harm caused by UDOTs 
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infringement of that right. Loss of business, typically measured as net lost profits, is the 
measure of recovery for unlawful infringement of the right to use land to operate a business. 
See, e.g.. Canyon Country Store v. Bracev, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989)(right to use 
commercial tractor trailer); Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co.; 722 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986)(right 
to operate business for distribution of coal trailers; net profits not shown); Cook Associates, 
Inc. v. Warnich 664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983)(right to use explosives plant); State Road Coirin 
v. Rozzelle, 101 Utah 464, 120 P.2d 276 (1941)(recovery for loss of business denied; no 
foundational property right alleged). 
E. UDOT's closure of the 45th South offramp for about 4 years during the 1-15 
reconstruction "caused" Appellant's harm which, if a jury so determines, 
renders UDOT liable for the resulting harm 
The trial court did not reach the issue of causation, but since it will arise on remand, 
this court should address it. Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure-Rite, Inc., 2001 UT App 347, 
f26, 37 P.3d 1202 (court has duty to pass on issues that may become material on remand). 
Appellant properly alleged a !,taking,f for "public use" caused Appellants harm. (R. 
5-7, Addendum Exhibit 3, f|18-27(alleging actions by UDOT and resulting harm to 
Appellant; f 3 5(f f injury to Intermountain was the unavoidable result of the City and UDOTfs 
action")). As a threshold matter, the trial court erred by not applying the proper standard for 
motions for judgment on the pleadings. It should have accepted all factual allegations and 
all reasonable inferences therefrom as true, and should have denied UDOTs motion. 
Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2002 UT 101, \2, 57 P.3d 1067; Colman v. Utah State Land 
Board, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). 
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As a matter of substance, compensable harm is that which is a "direct and necessary 
consequence" of the 1-15 reconstruction. Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County. 2002 UT 
17, f 28,42 P.3d 379. Appellant alleged such a causal connection. (R. 5-7, Addendum Exhibit 
3, ffi[18-27). "Intent is not an element of [an inverse condemnation] action." Farmers New 
World Life Insurance Co. v. Biountiful City. 803 P.2d at 1246. The drafters of Utah's Just 
Compensation Clause were well aware that unintentionally-caused harm also should be | 
compensable. Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 327 
(1898)("Damage is not always—in fact is not often contemplated or expected. It comes 
i 
unlooked for as the consequence of an act which the party performs.")(Samuel R. 
ThurmanXAddendum Exhibit 4). 
In the final analysis, the question of causation is one of fact for the jury, as the drafters 
also recognized. See id., ("...the means of arriving at the estimate are within the knowledge 
of men and can be adduced before a jury.") g 
F. The jury also may offset any special benefits Appellant derived from the project 
The drafters of the Utah Constitution were well aware that compensation paid for 
4 
harm caused by public projects has commensurate fiscal impacts on governments. 
Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, 327-28 (1898)(Dennis Clay 
EichnorX Addendum Exhibit 4). Thus, the drafters understood that such projects confer 
special benefits as well as impose special costs, so the drafters provided that a jury would 
offset such benefits against such costs. See id., 328 ("Of course,... whatever benefit results < 
by reason of [an] improvement is set off against the damage that is caused, and in that way 
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the public gets absolute justice in relation to the matter... .")(Franklin S. Richards). 
The principle of offsetting benefits against harms from public improvements is well 
established in the law. In the analogous area of county and city improvement districts, special 
benefits conferred by public projects are traditionally offset against special harm suffered. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 17A-3-201 et seq. (counties); §§ 17A-3-301 et seq. (cities). Examples 
of such projects include reconstruction, maintenance and repair of streets, crosswalks and 
alleys. UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-3-204(l)(c)(counties); § 17A-3-304(l)(c)(cities). Local 
governments may impose charges for infrastructure improvements on landowners specially 
benefitted by those improvements, but only "to the extent of the benefits to the property by 
reason of the improvements... ." UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A-3-216(l)(counties); § 17A-3-
316(l)(cities). A landowner owner may contest before a board of equalization both whether 
benefits (or harms) have been imposed, and the amount of such benefits (or harms). UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 17A-3-217(5)(counties); § 17A-3-317(5)(cities). The boards1 determinations 
are subject to judicial review. UTAHCODEANN. § 17A-3-229(counties); § 17A-3-330(cities). 
The issues at the heart of special improvement district settings and in takings settings 
are strikingly similar: Which of the impacts on the landowner resulting from the public 
project are properly characterized as "benefits" and which are "harms"? And of such benefits 
and harms, which are "special"-uniquely affecting the landowner--as opposed to "publics-
common to the entire community? See 4 Sands, Libonati & Martinez, LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
LAW, §§24.23-24.24 (identification of private benefits and apportionment of special 
assessments). The jury on remand in this case would be required to determine the unique 
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4 
harm imposed on Appellant from the 1-15 reconstruction and to deduct the benefits, if any, 
I 
uniquely conferred on Appellant from the project. That would simply be the mirror image 
of the special improvement district setting, in which the special benefits conferred on 
landowners—and therefore the assessments imposed—are reduced by the special harm 
suffered as a result of construction of the improvements involved. 
II, UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS CLAIM: < 
UDOT UNLAWFULLY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST APPELLANT 
A. The statutes from which UDOT draws its power to construct freeways and 
authorize U DOT t o d ictate t he m anner i n w hich such c onstruction w ill b e 4 
performed are "laws" which were applied non-uniformly by UDOT, violating 
Appellant's right to Uniform Operation of Laws 
The trial court concluded that the statutes from which UDOT draws its power to 
i 
construct freeways and authorize UDOT to dictate the manner in which such construction 
will be performed are not "laws" applied non-uniformly by UDOT. (R. 291, Addendum 
Exhibit 2, p.7, f 19) i 
First, it is unequal treatment that the right to the Uniform Operation of Laws prohibits. 
Article I Section 24 embodies the principle that "persons similarly situated should be treated \ 
similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their 
circumstances were the same." UTAH CONST, ART. I, §24("A11 laws of a general nature shall 
have uniform operation."); Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (1984). The plain terms of 
Article I Section 24 provide a right to be free from unlawful discriminatory treatment in the 
"operation" of laws. State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, fl2, 63 P.3d 667. And the Utah 
Supreme Court has emphasized that the focus of the Uniform Laws protection is on unequal Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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treatment: the provision "guards against disparate effects in the application of laws." Gallivan 
v. Walker. 2002 UT 89, f38, 54 P.3d 1069; Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 
1993)("The legislature has considerable discretion in the designation of classifications but 
the court must determine whether such classifications operate equally on all persons similarly 
situated."). 
The United States Supreme Court similarly has held that the federal Equal Protection 
Clause restricts not just legislative action, but also administrative action implementing 
legislation. Nordlinger v. Hahn. 505 U.S. 1, 16 n.8 (1992)(Equal Protection Clause 
applicable to both legislative and administrative action); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. 
County Comm'n of Webster Cty.. 488 U.S. 336, 338 (1989)(county tax assessor's 
administrative action in valuation of real property, pursuant to power conferred by general 
state tax statutes to conduct such assessments, violated Equal Protection). 
Appellant alleged there were other businesses similarly situated to Appellant which 
also depended on the 45th South offramp. (R. 6, Addendum Exhibit 3, f26). Appellant 
further alleged that "... UDOT ... discriminated against Plaintiff in violation of Article I, 
Section 24 of the Utah Constitution, by among other things, arbitrarily and capriciously 
providing [those other similarly situated] businesses" with accommodations not provided to 
Appellant-including diversion of traffic to provide such businesses with continued access 
to the 45th South offramp—and that such discriminatory treatment was "unreasonable and... 
not for a legitimate legislative purpose." (R. 10, Addendum Exhibit 3, f^l[39, 40). Such 
allegations sufficiently state a claim for denial of uniform operation of laws by alleging that 
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persons situated similarly to Appellant were treated more favorably than Appellant, without 
a reasonable legislative objective to warrant such discrimination. Arndt v. First Interstate 
Bank of Utah, N. A.. 1999 UT 9142,991 P.2d 584 (reasonable inferences must be drawn in 
favor of Plaintiff); Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light. 969 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah i 
1998)(pleadings need only give fair notice). 
Second, discrimination is unlawful under the Uniform Laws prohibition if it is | 
undertaken pursuant to governmental authority. And there is no doubt that UDOT acted 
under governmental authority here. UDOT is a creature of statute. Cf. Faux v. Mickelsen. 
i 
725 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1986)(small claims court is creature of statute). The "law" alleged by 
Appellant as having nonuniform operation consists of the statutes from which UDOT draws 
- its power to construct freeways and authorize UDOT to dictate the manner in which such * 
construction will be performed. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § § 72-6-101 - -119("Construction, 
Maintenance, and Operations" of state highways by UDOT)(Addendum Exhibit 1) . 
B. Appellant's allegation that UDOT unlawfully discriminated against Appellant 
by arbitrarily and capriciously providing other businesses similarly situated to 
Appellant with accommodations not provided to Appellant sufficiently alleges 
membership in an identifiable class for purposes of Appellant's Uniform < 
Operation of Laws claim 
The trial court erroneously concluded Appellant was not a member of an "identifiable 
class" for purposes of the right to Uniform Laws. (R. 291, Addendum Exhibit 2, p.7, ^ fl9) * 
The first type of protection provided by the Uniform Laws provision is that members 
of the same class—by definition similarly situated—must be treated the same. Malan v. Lewis, . 
693 P.2d 661,670 (1984)(" Article I, §24 protects against two types of discrimination. First, 
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•1 I  in nmisl applh, npui lh In ill |HM SOU* n ullim a i II. IUS "I \ ppellant alleged, there were other 
businesses similarly situated to Appellant which also depended on the 45th South offramp. 
(R 6, Addendum Exhibit 3, f 26). Appellant thereby alleged a "class" whose members were 
similarly situated ' J'•• ' : ' ":' • " ' ' " ' "^ : * • ' " ' '' ' " '' ' • ' - •• ' 
of Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution, by among other things, arbitrarily and 
capriciously providing [those other similarly situated] businesses" with accommodations not 
muled In \ ppi liitnl IIK In ISIOII nl In lilii In | HI iii Hihi Il  iiich bus iness" \ulh-
continued access to the 45th South offramp~and that such discriminatory 'treatment was 
"unreasonable and not foi a legitimate legislative purpose,11 (R. 10, Addendum, Exhibit 3 , 
1J1H9, -40) P r o l i a n t thereby allowed in i d c n ^ n h l r -lass- and tb-+ ^ D O ^ fronted the 
. t - • > • lember • • • • * * : 5 • • n • ' * • t 
J
 * oi Uni iu im Laws violation. Ma]an i . t ev\ i > O 9 J F.2d al 070. 
The second type of protection provided by the IJ niform Laws provision is that if 
members of the same c l a s s -by definition similarly situated—are treated differently,, then "the 
different tiraliiiiinitl p m n lln i lasses miiil \^ I U M J I i IIHIHI'IK'IM. ilmi h.m> ,i ii>,Knii,<hK' 
tendency to fui ther the objectives of the statute. MuLi- ..-. ± JI>, o y i r .2d ai 0 70. Ana that 
protection applies even if only one membci of the class ib singled ju t : J I uniavoi- ' - .e 
treatment, as in this case. Id. ("When persons are similarly situated,.,, it is unconstitutional to 
single out c •iiepei sc r from among a largei class ') 
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Appellant alleged that UDOT singled out appellant for less favorable treatment than 
other similarly situated businesses, and that such discriminatory treatment was "unreasonable 
and ... not for a legitimate legislative purpose." (R. 10, Addendum Exhibit 3,1fl[39, 40). 
Appellant therefore properly stated a claim of the "second type" of Uniform Laws violation. 
Malan v.Lewis. 693 P.2dat670 (1984). Appellant's "second type" claim had two alternative 
components: that there was no legitimate governmental objective for the classification 
imposing the disparate treatment, and that even if there were, the classification imposing the 
disparate treatment was unreasonable because it did not "have a reasonable tendency to 
further" such legitimate governmental objective. Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d at 670. 
. CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the final judgment by the trial court and remand the case 
for further proceedings. UDOT should be taxed with costs on appeal. 
DATED this J P _ day of May, 2004. 
i 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit 1: UTAH CODE ANN; § § 72- o i 01 . . . 
Exhibit 2: Final Order of the Hoiionible William B. Bohling entered on December 
11, 2003, granting UDOTs Motion for Judgment on the * ladings 
I " i l l I i l l i n III I ' l ' i i 11 i p II i in i ill II 
-Exhibit 4: Excerpts: Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Com mention 
(1898)(pp. 326-29, 333, 336-37, 625-26) 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 1 
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; iAc 72. Transportation *. ode 
Chapter 6. Construction, Maintenance, and Operations-
72 • 6-101 Title. -' '^-:'' " ;: :i*: " 
This chapter is known as the "Construction, Maintenance, and Operations A ct " 
The department shall: 
(1) prepare and adopt uniform standard plans and specifications for the construction and 
maintenance of state highways; and 
(2) issue a manual containing plans and specifications for the information and guidance of 
officials having supervision of the construction and maintenance of state highways. ' 
72-6-103 Plans, specifications, and estimates foi ciil i ei ts, bridges, and i • :> \ I 
construction. 
The department shah i. {•• • i I^ UIK i..s, and estimates for culverts, bridges, '• 
road construction, and otlu. > . I »u \ • i mation desired by local highway authorities for 
use on county roads and city streets on terms mutually agreed upon. 
72-6-104 Highways to conform to grade and direction in municipalities. 
Except for the highways part of the interstate system, a highway that extends through a 
municipality shall conform to the direction and grade of other streets in the municipality 
unless permission is obtained from the highway aiith^,Hi"- '•'"<^- ivnnirjpa^l ft™ 
variance in the direction and grade 
72-6-105 Contracts for construction and maintenance —Agreements with county or 
municipality. 
The department may enter into written agreements on behalf of the state with any county 
or municipality for rights-of-way and'the construction or maintenance of any part of a '' 
state highway: 
(1) at the expense of the state; 
(2) at the expense of any county or muiiic1 \\\ !•t »i 
(3) at the joint expense of the state and any count}' and an} municipal" „ 
72-6-106 Use of recycled asphalt 
(1) In making plans, specifications, ar.u cs, and m ud\ ortising for bids unde i this 
chapter, the department shall allow up u nut ma\ allow up to 60% reclain i ;> :! asphalt 
paver™ *nt >^ !^ mr<>mnr;iioH into l in l ^•^'.!?t; * -^^ « >• **«*<* for road coiisti i i :ti ::: ii and 
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i 
maintenance. 
i 
(2) The department shall ensure that hot asphaltic concrete incorporating reclaimed 
asphalt pavement meets or exceeds the department quality standards for roads constructed 
or maintained with hot asphaltic concrete not containing reclaimed asphalt pavement. 
(3) If the department rejects any hot asphaltic concrete containing reclaimed asphalt 
pavement, the department shall give a written statement to the provider indicating the 
specific reasons the hot asphaltic concrete was rejected. 
(4) This section does not authorize the state to directly or indirectly subsidize the * 
production of hot asphaltic concrete containing reclaimed asphalt pavement. 
72-6-107 Construction or improvement of highway —Contracts —Retainage. 
(1) (a) The department shall make plans, specifications, and estimates prior to the 
construction or improvement of any state highway. I 
(b) Except as provided in Section 63-56-36.1 and except for construction or 
improvements performed with state prison labor, a construction or improvement project 
with an estimated cost exceeding the bid limit as defined in Section 72-6-109 for labor 
and materials shall be performed under contract awarded to the lowest responsible bidder. 
(c) The advertisement for bids shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in * 
the county in which the work is to be performed, at least once a week for two consecutive 
weeks, with the last publication at least ten days before bids are opened. 
(d) The department shall receive sealed bids and open the bids at the time and place 
designated in the advertisement. The department may then award the contract but may . 
reject any and all bids. 
(e) If the department's estimates are substantially lower than any responsible bid received, 
the department may perform any work by force account. 
(2) If any payment on a contract with a private contractor for construction or I 
improvement of a state highway is retained or withheld, the payment shall be retained or 
withheld and released as provided in Section 13-8-5. 
(3) If the department performs a construction or improvement project by force account, 
the department shall: 
(a) provide an accounting of the costs and expenditures of the improvement including 
material and labor; 
(b) disclose the costs and expenditures to any person upon request and allow the person to 
make a copy and pay for the actual cost of the copy; and I 
(c) perform the work using the same specifications and standards that would apply to a 
private contractor. 
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(4) In <v eonlance with utic o.;, v uapit . \ ..HH-JIM. 
ikpaiimeni shall establish procedures iot 
{&) hearing evidence that a region witlim the de| t violated this section, aid 
(b) administering sanctions against the region if the regh >n is found m \ lolauon. 
72 6-108 Class B and C roads -Improvement projects -Contracts — Retainage, 
I 1) A county executive for class B roads and the municipal executive for class C roads 
shall cause plans, specifications, and estimates to be made prior to the construction 
improvement project, as defined in Section 72-6-109, on a class B or C road il the 
estimated cost for any one project exceeds the bid limit as defined in Section 72-6-109 for 
labor, equipment, and materials. . : ' ^ • '"': • 
(2) (a) All projects in excess of the bid limit shall be performed under control fo be let to 
the lowest responsible bidder 
(b) If the estimated cost of the improvement project exceeds the bid limn ioi 
equipment, and materials, the project may not be divided to permit the const • 
parts, unless each part is done by contract. 
f ? J '1 he advertisement on bids shall be published in a newspaper of general • ulation in 
the county in which the work is to he performed at leaM nr» e i week lor three 
iv-nsecutive weeks. If there ss no newspaper of general circulation, the notice Jiallbc 
^ -i. d lor at lea.st 20 davs \r ! i<*;isl f\\ .* public places in the county. 
^H; .lie counu u, municipal v.^v,uie*^ . i aiui viesigik., ..ii.ill eeci\c sealed • •. ^ im*i <-p-. a 
the bids at the time and place designated in the advertisement Ihe county or municipal 
executn e or then designee may then award the contract but mav reject anv and all bids* 
(5) The persoi 1 v -j ,*orp« nation that is awarded a contract under this section is subject 
u ihe provisions of Title o.*. rhaptei ISO, Utah Procurement Code. 
(6) If any paymun wu
 t?* UJIU.K i with a private contractor for construction or " -
improvement of a class 13 or C road is retained or withheld, the payment sha1 • 
or withheld and released as provided in Section 13-8-5, 
72-6-109 Class B and C roads -Construction and maintenance - Definitions » 
Estimates lower than bids—Accountability. 
(1) As used in this section and Section 72-6-108: 
(n\ lfRJ,| limit" means: 
- • 2003 $125,0 iii a 1 ••" -^  • ' ' ' • ' "; <>' ' • ' - •• •• •. "' 
(ii) for each year after 2003, the amount of the bid limit fbi (lie pirvions vein phi:.1 :iii 
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amount calculated by multiplying the amount of the bid limit for the previous year by the 
lesser of 3% or the actual percent change in the Consumer Price Index during the 
previous calendar year. 
(b) "Consumer Price Index" means the Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States 
Department of Labor. 
(c) (i) "Construction" means the work that would apply to: 
(A) any new roadbed either by addition to existing systems or relocation; 
(B) resurfacing of existing roadways with more than two inches of bituminous pavement; 
or 
(C) new structures or replacement of existing structures, except the replacement of 
drainage culverts. 
(ii) "Construction" does not include maintenance, emergency repairs, or the installation of 
traffic control devices as described in Section 41-6-20. 
(d) "Improvement project" means construction and maintenance as defined in this section 
except for that maintenance excluded under Subsection (2). 
(e) "Maintenance" means the keeping of a road facility in a safe and usable 
condition to which it was constructed or improved, and includes: 
(i) the reworking of an existing surface by the application of up to and including two 
inches of bituminous pavement; 
(ii) the installation or replacement of guardrails, seal coats, and culverts; 
(iii) the grading or widening of an existing unpaved road or flattening of shoulders or side 
slopes to meet current width and safety standards; and 
(iv) horizontal or vertical alignment changes necessary to bring an existing road in 
compliance with current safely standards. 
(f) "Project" means the performance of a clearly identifiable group of associated road 
construction activities or the same type of maintenance process, where the construction or 
maintenance is performed on any one class B or C road, within a half-mile proximity and 
occurs within the same calendar year. 
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(l) ihe following types of man *< 
requirements of this section: 
(a) the repair of less than 'the entire surface by crack sealing or patching; and 
(b) road repairs incidental lo ihr installation, replacement, or repair of water mains, 
sewers, drainage pipes, culverts, or curbs and gutters, 
(3) (a) (i) If the estimates of a qualified engineer refen ed to in Section 72 6 108 ai e 
substantially lower than any responsible bid received or in the event no bids ai e receii 'ed 
the county or municipality may perform the work by force account. 
(Yi) Tn no e^eni shall "substantially lower" mean estimates thai are less than 10% below 
thr lowest responsible hid. 
• , ;\:. ,• ,:^au an impro\ emem pi o;i,,; ^. force account, it shall: 
(i) provide an accountm^ ,n .he eosis a;;a expenditures u inc. linpi-1 < ement 
including nmlenal, labor, and direct equipment costs to he calculated using the Cost 
Reterence Guide for Constiuetion liquipnient b) DataqueslL^., 
UH disclose the costs and expenditures to any person upon request and allow the person to 
make a copy and pa} for the actual i o;,i -fllie enpv, an-
{C) pe iurm I U * - ; ,. ... ~ r- . =•; I a 
private contractor. 
(4) In accordant ; w n\\ Title *\:-. Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the 
department shall establish procedures t(? 
(a) hearing evidence thai a n don >A ith = n (he department violated this section; and 
72- 6-108 Class B and C roads —Imps ..\ cmiut j , . .>, . . i ,/iui .< 
(1) A county executh e for class B road* and the mum \Vd\ execute. s 
shall cause plans, specifications, and estimates u* be made pn*>? to the construction ul any 
improvement project, as defined in Section ~^ J •' ': W, * >a a .'la>s B . road if the 
estimated cost ioi air. win; pioject exceeds tin i:.** inn ; .iehned m Section "2-f> 10^ for 
labor, equipment, m-' maten iK 
the lowest responsible oiddes 
(b) 1 f the estimated cost of the improvement pro|ect exceeds the bid 1m- » *5 
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4 
equipment, and materials, the project may not be divided to permit the construction in 
parts, unless each part is done by contract. i 
(3) The advertisement on bids shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in 
the county in which the work is to be performed at least once a week for three 
consecutive weeks. If there is no newspaper of general circulation, the notice shall be 
posted for at least 20 days in at least five public places in the county. ' 
(4) The county or municipal executive or their designee shall receive sealed bids and open 
the bids at the time and place designated in the advertisement. The county or municipal 
executive or their designee may then award the contract but may reject any and all bids. . 
(5) The person, firm, or corporation that is awarded a contract under this section is subject 
to the provisions of Title 63, Chapter 56, Utah Procurement Code. 
(6) If any payment on a contract with a private contractor for construction or < 
improvement of a class B or C road is retained or withheld, the payment shall be retained 
or withheld and released as provided in Section 13-8-5. 
72-6-109 Class B and C roads —Construction and maintenance — Definitions — 
Estimates lower than bids—Accountability. * 
(1) As used in this section and Section 72-6-108: 
(a) "Bid limit1' means: 
(i) for the year 2003, $125,000; and 
(ii) for each year after 2003, the amount of the bid limit for the previous year, plus an 
amount calculated by multiplying the amount of the bid limit for the previous year by the 
lesser of 3% or the actual percent change in the Consumer Price Index during the 
previous calendar year. < 
(b) "Consumer Price Index" means the Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers as published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States 
Department of Labor. 
i 
(c) (i) "Construction" means the work that would apply to: 
(A) any new roadbed either by addition to existing systems or relocation; 
(B) resurfacing of existing roadways with more than two inches of bituminous pavement; 
or 
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(C) new structures oi icplanitiinil ol c\is1in|» shut tun i, e\n pi llic irplacvincnl iif • •'• '^ '' 
drainage culverts. 
(IP) "Construction11 does not include maintenance, emergency repairs, or the installation of 
Iral'fic control devices as described in Section41-6-20. -:: •' • ^,-
(d) "Improvement project" means con *"^ce as defined in 1 his section 
except for that mainten'vv*" -,x -h*Ar- * 
(e) "Maintenance" means the keeping of a road facility in a safe and usable • 
condition to which it was constructed or improved, and includes: • : 
(i) the reworking of an existing surface K flu applieaflwi Tup fo and inrudiug t ^ 
inches of bituminous pavement, 
v<- :\ h *• v . - .. .1 . • - i - • - ,; 
•, n; i ihe grading or w idrning .M an existing unpaved road oi iiattenimr -x-f shouideia vi side 
slopes to meet current width and safety standards; and •' • • 
r:
~* horizontal or vertical alignment changes necessary to bring an existing road in -: 
,. • •mpliance W:th current sairU standards. 
{!) "Project" ii«caurt iiiv. pei iwmkin^ of a clearly identil i,ir «•: i iuup ui assoc*ah u IUUU 
construction activities or the same type of maintenance process, where the construction or 
maintenance is performed on any one class B or C road, within a half-mile proximity and 
occurs within the same calendar year. 
(2) The following types of maintenance work arc not subject U> flic confraci .> hi-,' *' \ <r' 
requirements of this section: 
(a) the repair of less than the entire surface by crack sealing or patching; and "'.' : •-'.-
(b) road repaii.s tuc idcnial io the installation, replacemcnl, or irpjiir ofwalki mams," 
sewers, drainau** pipes, culverts, or curbs and gutters. 
(3) (a) (i) If the estimates of a qualified engineer referred to in Section 72- 6-1 OS arc 
substantially lower than any responsible bid received or in the event no bids are received, 
the county or municipality may perform the work by force account. 
(ii, MI no event shall "substantial!) lo v * • n r mean estimates that are less than 1 0% below 
the lowest responsible bid. 
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I 
(b) If a county or municipality performs an improvement project by force account, it shall: 
(i) provide an accounting of the costs and expenditures of the improvement 
including material, labor, and direct equipment costs to be calculated using the Cost 
Reference Guide for Construction Equipment by Dataquest Inc.; 
(ii) disclose the costs and expenditures to any person upon request and allow the person to 
make a copy and pay for the actual cost of the copy; and 
(iii) perform the work using the same specifications and standards that would apply to a 
private contractor. 4 
72-6-110 Supervision and standards of construction for class B and C roads. 
(1) All construction plans, specifications, aind estimates and all construction work under 
Section 72-6-108 shall be prepared and performed under the direct supervision of a 
registered professional engineer. ^ 
(2) The supervising engineer shall certify to the county legislative body or the municipal 
executive that all road construction projects conform to design and construction standards 
as currently adopted by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation 
officials. 
72-6-111 Construction and maintenance of appurtenances —Noise abatement 
measures. 
(1) The department is authorized to construct and maintain appurtenances along the state ^ 
highway system necessary for public safety, welfare, and information. Appurtenances 
include highway illumination, sidewalks, curbs, gutters, steps, driveways, retaining walls, 
fire hydrants, guard rails, noise abatement measures, storm sewers, and rest areas. 
(2) A noise abatement measure may only be constructed by the department along a < 
highway when: 
(a) the department is constructing a new state highway or performing major 
reconstruction on an existing state highway; 
(b) the Legislature provides an appropriation or the federal government provides funding 
for construction of retrofit noise abatement along an existing state highway; or 
(c) the cost for the noise abatement measure is provided by citizens, adjacent property 
owners, developers, or local governments. I 
(3) In addition to the requirements under Subsection (2), the department may only 
construct noise abatement measures within the unincorporated area of a county or within 
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. .„,;,..,ipaiity that has an ordinance or general plan that requires: 
(a) a study to be conducted to determine the noise levels along new development .iiljiu nil 
to an existing state highway or a dedicated right-of-way; and 
(b) the construction of noise abatement measures at the expense of the developer if 
required, to be constructed under standards established by a rule of the depann T+ 
v-ry IU accordance with Iltlc w.>, Chapter 4(111, I H.ili Admmntrntirr Mulcinakhij.- Ai I, (In 
department shall make rules establishing: 
(a) when noise abatement measures are required to be constructed, including standards for 
decibel levels of traffic noise; 
(b) the decibel level of traffic noise which identifies the projects to be programmed by the' 
commission for the earliest construction of retrofit noise abatement measures funded 
under Subsection (2)(b) based on availability of funding; and 
(c) a priority system, for the construction of other retrofit noise abatement measures that 
meet or exceed the standards established under this section and are funded under 
Subsection (2)(b) which includes: •''' • 
(i) the number of residential dwellings adversely affected by the traffic noise; 
HI " i 'In I'OSI elk1" li\ enoii.s oi mi t iga t ing the traffic no i se ; and •• '; ''""' 
(iii) the l eng th u . nine i:;c j ^ ; t . ^ ; I L * ^ I -.fir:!l! i i i = d^« 1 
the standards established under this seuiun. 
72 -6-112 Traffic Noise Abatement Progran I scv 
(1) There is created the Traffic Noise Abatem.-?'" r rogunn. •*•>'••.•••• • -
(2) The program consists ofm.oni.es generated from the following revenue sources: •• 
(a) any voluntary contributions received for traffic noise abatement; and 
(b) appropriations made to the program by the I ,egislaiure. 
(3) The department shall use program monies as j u tut .uzeu by the commission and as 
provided by law for the study, design, construction, and maintenance of noise abatement 
measures. 
(4) All f ending foi the Traffic Noise Abatement Piugi^n. ^u11 V- nonlapsing. 
72-6-113 Acquisition and improvement
 0f ian(j for preservation of scenic beauty — 
Authority of department. 
(1) T h e d e p a r t m e n t is a u t h o i i / c d U\ ; iu| i i iu MI id "input1 r sli "|u< nf I mi I nece s s i t y l<if <l1" 
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restoration, preservation, and enhancement of scenic beauty within and adjacent to a 
federal-aid highway of this state, including acquisition of publicly owned and controlled i 
rest and recreation areas, sanitary, and other facilities within or adjacent to the highway 
right-of-way reasonably necessary to accommodate the traveling public. 
(2) Acquisition may be by gift, purchase, or exchange but may not be by condemnation. 
(3) The interest in any land authorized to be acquired and maintained under this section 
may be fee simple or any lesser interest, as determined by the department to be reasonably 
necessary to accomplish the purposes of this section. 
(4) (a) Real property, or any interest in real property, acquired under this section is part of 
the adjacent or nearest highway and is under the jurisdiction of the department. 
(b) The department may enter into an agreement with any state agency for maintenance of 
land acquired in accordance with this section. 
{ 
72-6-114 Restricting use of or closing highway —Penalty for failure to observe 
barricade, warning light, etc, 
(1) A highway authority may close or restrict travel on a highway under their jurisdiction 
due to construction, maintenance work, or emergency. 
(2) If a highway or portion of a highway is closed or restricted to travel, a highway 
authority shall cause suitable barriers and notices to be posted and maintained in 
accordance with Section 41-6-20. 
(3) A person who willfully fails to observe any barricade, warning light, sign, or flagman, 
used in accordance with this section, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
72-6-115 Traffic Management Committee —Appointment —Duties. 
(1) As used in this section, "committee" means the Traffic Management Committee < 
created in this section. 
(2) (a) There is created within the Department of Transportation the Traffic Management 
Committee comprising up to 13 members laiowledgeable about traffic engineering, traffic 
flow, air quality, or intelligent transportation systems as follows: { 
(i) two members designated by the executive director of the department; 
(ii) one member designated by the Utah Association of Counties;
 ( 
(iii) one member designated by the Department of Environmental Quality; 
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1 mi ' 1 H i r n i c i n b i i in l i r ' s i j i j i i i l c d h y IIIIIH; W i n iiicli h u m Regional \ "oiinal, ; ""='• :'- . • " 
l^ v) one member designated by the Mountainland Association :>f Governme nts; 
(vi) one member designated by the Commissioner of Public Safety; and 
I • ..; one member designated hy the I llali League of Cities and Towns ; '?; - ' • 
^vmj one member designated by the general managei of a public transit ui , • M h more' 
than 200,000 people residing within the public transit di.stri.ct boundaries ; 
(ix) up to four additional members designated by the committee for one-year terms, and 
(X; a designating entity under Subsections (2)(a)(i) through fviiH may designate an 
alt-.-mali1 e member to serve in the absence of its designated member, 
( ar .* , - , , 
(i ; advise the department on matters related to the implementation ; i " -in : 
this section; 
(ii) make recommendations to law enforcement agencies related fo traffic flow and 
incident management during heavy traffic periods; 
( in ; .«jhe P •< • • i .:>,A\* U, Hie tkpaui- -n an-> municipalities on incieasing 
file saicty and u n M.HI y of highways usin, "lallie management systems, 
including traffic signal coordination, tint!' ui, frerway ramp metering ^ 
message signing, and incident management, and 
(iv) evaluate the cost effectiveness of implementing a specific traffic management
 : i r 
on a highway considering: 
( A ) »i«!»nr U:.1* - • i; 
(B) the necessity and potential of reducing vehicle emissions m the aiea, 
(O the feasibilih ^filie traffic management system on the highway; and ; -
(Dj .^,.ici U.-MM ^Higt.^ioi ^ ii1 be reduced b y the system. 
(c) The i . ; . . -fiair and a vice chair from,, its members. 
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(d) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any reason, the replacement shall be 
appointed. 
(e) The committee shall meet as it determines necessary to accomplish its duties. 
(f) Reasonable notice shall be given to each member of the committee prior to any 
meeting. 
(g) A majority of the committee constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business. 
(h) (i) (A) Members who are not government employees shall receive no 
compensation or benefits for their services., but may receive per diem and expenses 
incurred in the performance of the member's official duties at the rates established by the 
Division of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A- 3-107. 
(B) Members may decline to receive per diem and expenses for their service. 
(ii) (A) State government officer and employee members who do not receive salary, per 
diem, or expenses from their agency for their service may receive per diem and expenses 
incurred in the performance of their officml duties from the committee at the rates 
established by the Division of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(B) State government officer and employee members may decline to receive per diem and 
expenses for their service. 
(iii) (A) Local government members who do not receive salary, per diem, or expenses 
from the entity that they represent for their service may receive per diem and expenses 
incurred in the performance of their official duties at the rates established by the Division 
of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63 A-
3-107. ... . -
(B) Local government members may decline to receive per diem and expenses for their service. 
(3) (a) The Department of Transportation shall implement and administer traffic 
management systems to facilitate the efficient flow of motor vehicle traffic on state 
highways to improve regional mobility, and to reduce motor vehicle emissions where 
those improvements are cost effective, as determined by the committee in accordance 
with criteria under Subsection (2)(b). 
(b) A traffic management system shall be designed to allow safe, efficient, and effective: 
(i) integration of existing traffic management systems; 
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jurisdiction; 
(iii) incorporation of other traffic management systems; and 
I < I adaptation l<> Indue Iraliic needs. ' '•••• ' • ; • :; : ' '••• •• "' ' • • ^ , '•-' ':'; '' '' • - * 
(4) (a) J he cost of implementing and administering a traffic management system * 
shared pro rata by the department and the counties and municipalities using it 
(b) The department shall enter into an agreement or contract under Title 11, Chapter 13, 
Interlocal Cooperation Act, with a county or municipality to share costs incurred under 
this section. 
(5) Additional highways and intersections «m I' i H» adminislrii' | I " I 
county or municipality may be added In *i in iilin IIII mafniictif iv-ih in mjHiii .i|i|iliuiu in nil 
the county or municipality after: 
(a) a recommendation of the committee; 
(b) approval by the department; 
(c) determination of the appropriate cost share of the addition under ' ••'•"r;,'; ;:" 
Subsection (4)(a); and 
(jj
 a i l agreement under SubseetH n (4YhY 
(6) The committee may establish technical advisory coimmltees as needed to assist m 
accomplishing its duties under this see; 
72-6-116 Regulation of utilities —Relocation of utilities, 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Cost of relocation" includes the entire amount paiu i•; me utility company properly 
attributable to the relocation of the utility after deducting any increase in the value of the 
new utility and any salvage value derived from the old utility. 
(b) "I Jtiiity" includes telecommunication, gas, electricity, cable television, water, sewer, 
data, and video'transmission lines, drainage and irrigation systems, and other similar 
utilities located in, on, along, across, over, through, or under any state highway 
(., Utility company" means a privately, cooperatively, oi publicly owned 
utility, including utilities owned by political subdivisions 
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(2) (a) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, 
the department may make rules for the installation, construction, maintenance, repair, 
renewal, system upgrade, and relocation of all utilities. 
(b) If the department determines under the rules established in this section that it is 
necessary that any utilities should be relocated, the utility company owning or operating 
the utilities shall relocate the utilities in accordance with this section and the order of the 
department. 
(3) (a) The department shall pay 100% of the cost of relocation of a utility on a state 
highwayif the: : 
(i) utility is owned or operated by a political subdivision of the state; or 
(ii) utility company owns the easement or fee title to the right-of-way in which the utility 
is located. 
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(a) or (c), the department shall pay 50% of the 
cost of relocation of a utility on a state highway and the utility company shall pay the 
remainder of the cost of relocation. 
(c) This Subsection (3) does not affect the provisions of Subsection 72-7- 108(5). 
(4) If a utility is relocated, the utility company owning or operating the utility, its 
successors or assigns, may maintain and operate the utility, with the necessary 
appurtenances, in the new location. 
(5) In accordance with this section, the cost of relocating a utility in connection with any 
project on a highway is a cost of highway construction. 
(6) (a) The department shall notify affected utility companies whenever the relocation of 
utilities is likely to be necessary because of a reconstruction project. 
(b) The notification shall be made during the preliminary design of the project or as soon 
as practical in order to minimize the number, costs, and delays of 
utility relocations. 
(c) A utility company notified under this Subsection (6) shall coordinate with the 
department and the department's contractor on the utility relocations, including the 
scheduling of the utility reloczttions. 
72-6-117 Limited-access facilities and service roads —Access —Right-of- way 
acquisition —Grade separation —Written permission required. 
(1) A highway authority, acting alone or in cooperation with the federal government, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
another highway authority, or another state may plan, designate, establish, regulate, 
vacate, alter, improve, maintain, and provide a limited- access facility including a sex 
road to the limited-access facility. 
(2) A highway authoriU mav regulate, restrict oi piohll-r (he use of a limited-jocess 
facility by pedestrians, animals, or by the various classes ol' vehicles CM *r:r•. 
(3) A highway authority may divide and separate any limited-access iduiu v m S M;-
roadways by the construction of raised curbing, central dividing sections, or other 
physical separations, or by designating separate roadways by signs, markers, stripes, and 
other appropriate devices. 
(4N» A person ma> not enter, exit n «io>> a limited-access facility, except at designated 
:>< -M«S ai which access is permitted In the highway authonl' 
p , /i. Highway authority may acquire, by gift, devise, purchase, 
or public property and property rights for a limited- access facility and service road, 
including rights of access, air, view, and light. All property rights acquired under this 
section may be m tee simple or in any lesser estate or interest A highway auth-nl 
acquire an entm M ;.W I - traci ol i,.,:«i. if needed. e\ en though the entire iot. H* ly r 
tract is not immediately needed for the right-of-way o! Use limited-access facility or 
service road. 
(6) A highw ajv mum ^ igna te and establish liiiiiUu-.K LDh m * . new 
facilities or mav Ac^ .-» .1 establish an existing highw ^ ^^  n,|r< ^ -* i-mv-ess 
facility. 
\T\ fa) \ huilmny authority uu\ piovidr lor' me elimination oi ai grade intersection* of a 
U? -ined-access facility and an existing highway by grade 
M-istration, service road, or ^v closing the intersecting highway. 
(b) A highway authority may not connect or intersect a limited-access facility without 'the 
written consent and previous approval of the highway authority having jurisdiction over 
the limited-access facility. 
«T- Highway auihonue- ma\ enter into agreements with ea. I: .-the*. . \-uh ilv. federal 
government <> •;.. financing, planning, establishment, improvement, maintenance tse, 
umuiation, or \ M.-<\\U*\: o! limited-access facilities or oilier public ways in their respective 
lunsdiction, to lacihtatc the pin poses H thi\ section 
72-6-118 Definitions —Establishment and operatic! ii • c:i f tci Ill i i aj s Impositi a lit an cl 
collection of tolls —Amount of tolls —Rulemaking 
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(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Toll" means any tax, fee, or charge assessed for the specific use of a tollway. <• 
(b) "Tollway" means a highway, highway lane, bridge, path, tunnel, or right-of- way 
designed and used as a transportation route that is constructed, operated, or maintained 
through the use of toll revenues. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (3), the department may: 
(a) establish and operate tollways and related facilities for the purpose of 
funding in whole or in part the acquisition of right-of-way and the design, construction, 
reconstruction, operation, and maintenance of or impacts from a transportation route for 
use by the public; 4 
(b) enter into contracts, agreements, licenses, franchises, or other arrangements to 
implement this section; and 
(c) impose and collect tolls on any tollway established under this section. 
(3) (a) The department or other entity may not establish or operate a tollway on a state i 
highway, except as approved by the commission and the Legislature. 
(b) Between sessions of the Legislature, a state tollway may be designated or deleted if: 
(i) approved by the commission in accordance with the standards made under this section; 
and 
(ii) the tollways are submitted to the Legislature in the next year for legislative approval 
or disapproval. 
(c) In conjunction with a proposal submitted under Subsection (3)(b)(ii), the department ^ 
shall provide a description of the tollway project, projected traffic, the anticipated amount 
of tolls to be charged, and projected toll revenue. 
(4) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the 
commission shall set the amount of any toll imposed or collected on a tollway on a state < 
highway. 
(5) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the 
department shall make rules necessary to establish and operate tollways on state 
highways. The rules shall include minimum criteria for having a tollway. 
(6) The commission may provide funds for public or private tollway pilot projects from 
General Fund monies appropriated by the Legislature to the commission for that purpose. 
( 
72-6-119 "511" traveler information services —Lead agency — Implementation — 
Cooperation —Rulemaking —Costs. 
(1) As used in this section, "511" or "511 service" means three-digit telecommunications 
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:»„i:i\y to access miciiig^n; ^ U A J L ^ ; „: i ^ i.iioima!nMi ser.Kw p.w uit.i 
in the state in accordance with the Federal v^uimiiunications Commiaoion and Unitca 
States Department of Transportation. 
(2) The department is the state's lead agone> foi implementing 511 service and is tin 
state's point of contact for coordinating % 1 I s e n ice with telecommunications s e m o 
nroviders. 
1 ,
» >V depart n mil shall1 
:• v.nplement and administer" 511 service in the state; 
(b) coordinate with the highway authorities and public transit districts to p r o \ ' * 
advanced multimodal traveler information throm-1 •*' sen u o and other means; am i 
(c) in aceordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, "I *•. : : i \ v \< 1111' 111 < i k n 11 j > A11, 111. t k 15 
rules as necessary to implement this section. 
t4j (a) In accordance with i I!K ; \ « 'hapler I * inierh-- M i 'ooperation . u i Tie 
department shall *IH--M inio agreements oi coniraeis wnh highway authorities and public 
transit districts i<> share the /osts of implementing: and administering 511 service in the 
state. 
(by i lie department shall enter into other agreements or conu.n \^ icuumg iw u.-
sen-ice to offset the r<KK of implementing and administering % 1 ' ^ ^ **-** >•• rl -f •-' 
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• N D Y S . HUNTER (9084) 
STEVEN K. WALKENHORST (3356) 
JONI J. JONES (7562) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant UDOT 
160 East 300 South Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah «S4n 
Telephone: (801.1 Vi<>-0Hh) 
•iJ-MM. 5. COURT 
SALT L <\Kh ( ()l iN n SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, S TA IT OF I I \ l ! 
INTERMOUK1 ' «N SPORT1 V ORDER OKAiNilrNU I I 
DEPARTMENT O F 
Plaintiff, TRANSPORTATION'S MOTIONS 
: FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 
vs. PLEADINGS 
MURRAY CITY and UTAH Civil No.: 030917322 CD 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, : 
Judge: William B. Bohling 
Defendants. : 
. ' .A^IDOU i . .in... . i i i : heard ora! nrgument o r Defendant Utah Department 
oi Transportation b motions io: indumen! i l!.. ! ..!-;.• : • : i 
*•" nicy Gcnei.il. appealed on behalf ol 1 'tali Department of"Transportation ("I IIX T " ) and 
•i! •"< • '• • "• ' i. IUUKM m c uiui eeoiK)i:;ie ;. iulions. 
Randy S. Hunter, Assistant Utah Attorney General, appeared on behalf of UDOT and ai }.;ucd the 
FILED DISTRICT 00URT 
f
 Th!rd"JJudicial District 
DEC 1 12003 
TteputyCteJi 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
motion to dismiss Plaintiffs remaining claims for inverse condemnation, breach of contract, 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of Article I, § 22 of the Utah 
Constitution (labeled "Inverse Condemnation" in the Complaint). B. Ray Zoll appeared on 
behalf of Plaintiff Intermountain Sports, Inc. ("Intermountain"), and argued the tort claims. John 
Martinez also appeared on behalf of Intermountain and argued the remaining claims. 
The Court, having reviewed the briefs submitted by the parties and the case law cited 
therein, and having considered counsel's argument, and good cause appearing, hereby GRANTS 
UDOT'S 12(c) MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, dismissing all of 
Intermountain's claims against UDOT with prejudice. 
The Court bases its decision on the facts alleged in Intermountain's complaint and facts 
alleged in Intermountain's memoranda opposing UDOT's motion, as well as on the legal reasons 
in UDOT's memoranda, which are discussed below. 
RELEVENT FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Intermountain is a recreational vehicle sales company located at 4225 South 500 
West, Murray, Utah. (Compl. Iff 3, 8.) 
2. UDOT is a State agency. (Complaint f 5.) 
3. As part of its 145 Reconstruction Project (the "Project''), UDOT rebuilt the 4500 
South interchange with 1-15. During construction beginning in July 1997, off-ramps and on-
ramps to and from 4500 South, and 4500 South itself, were periodically closed. (Complaint 1fH 
10,19,21.) 
4. Intermountain claims that as a result of the Project, its customers and vendors were 
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denied reasonable access to its property, which substantially damaged its value. (Complaint U 
• • 2 5 . ) . . -
5. Intermountain also claims that other businesses along the Project, located further 
south, were not denied access to 4500 South and had a more direct access to 1-15 during 
construction. (GompLf 39.). 
6. Mermountain alleges that UDOT negligently planned and executed the traffic flow 
around plaintiff s property during construction, which interfered with its contractual relationships 
with customers and vendors. (Complaint U If 45,47.) 
7. According to Intermountain, UDOT represented that its 1-15 access through 4500 
South would be closed only one year, and that it would address Intermountain's concerns during 
the Project. Intermountain claims that, based on these representations, it did not sue UDOT 
during the Project. (Compl. ff 55-57.) 
8. Intermountain has sued UDOT for inverse condemnation (Article I, Section 22 of the 
Constitution); denial of uniform operation of laws (Article I, Section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution); breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, 
and intentional interference with economic relations. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In determining whether Mtermountain's Complaint must be dismissed under^R^ 
12(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court accepts the factual allegations in the 
complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Arndt v. 
First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A., 1999 UT 91 f 2, 991 P.2d 584 (quoting Golding v. Ashley 
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Cent Irr. Co., 793 P.2d 897, 898 (Utah 1990)). A motion for judgment on the pleadings should 
be granted when if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover under the facts alleged. Id. 
2. The Court finds that under the 12(c) standard all of Intermountain's claims are barred 
as a matter of law for the following reasons. 
INTERMOUNTAIN'S TORT CLAIMS 
3. Intermountain's tort claims are barred under the Governmental Immunity Act (the 
"Immunity Act*'). 
4. To determine whether a governmental entity is immune from suit under the Immunity 
Act, this Court must engage in a three-step analysis: (1) Is the activity at issue a governmental 
function, for which the legislature has granted blanket immunity in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3? 
(2) If so, then is blanket immunity waived in another section of the Immunity Act? (3) If blanket 
immunity has been waived, is there an exception to that waiver which retains immunity? See, 
e.g., Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete COM«0;, 2002 UT 17,1f 11,42 P.3d 379. 
5. Intermountain does not dispute that blanket immunity applies under the first step 
because it agrees that the activity at issue, reconstruction of 1-15, is a governmental function. 
6. Underthe secondstep, immunity is waived for^^ Intermountain's negligence claim 
under Section 63-30-10, which waives immunity "for injury proximately caused by a negligent 
act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment." Utah Code Ann. 
63-30-10 (1997 & Supp. 2001). 
7. Under the third step, however, immunity is retained because under § 63-30-10 
immunity for negligence is waived "except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or 
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results from.. .interference with contract rights?' Id. § 63-30-10(2) (emphasis added). 
8. Because Intermountain alleges in its complaint that UDOT's negligence interfered 
with its contractual relationships with vendors and customers (compl. f 47), the negligence claim 
is barred. 
9. Even if, as intermountain argues, it sustained other injuries, such as diminution in the 
value of its business, that injury would nonetheless "arise out of, in connection with or result 
from" the interference with contractual relations. The exception under § 53-30-10(2) is broad 
enough to cover the additionalinjuries Intermountain alleges. 
10. Even if Intermountain could allege some injury that was entirely unrelated to 
interference with its contractual relations, this Court concludes the negligence claim would still 
fail under the economic loss doctrine, which bars negligence claims that seek to recover only 
economic damages. See, e.g., SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, 2001 UT 34 ^  32,28 P.3d 669. 
11. The Court also concludes Intermountain's intentional interference with economic 
relations claim is barred under the Immunity Act. 
12. Applying the three-step analysis to the intentional interference claim, the Court 
concludes that blanket immunity applies for the reason stated in paragraph 5, above. Under the 
second step, blanket immunity is not waived, because the Immunity Act does not contain a 
provision that waives immunity for intentional torts generally or interference with economic 
relations specifically. 
13. The Court rejects Intermountain's argument that other provisions of the Immunity 
Act allow its negligence and intentional interference claims to proceed. According to 
e 
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Intermountain, these tort claims can be brought pursuant to § 63-30-8 and 63-30-10.5. 
14. Intermountain's tort claims cannot proceed under § 63-30-8 because immunity under 
that provision applies only to "a dangerous or defective condition of any highway." Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-8 (1997) (emphasis added). Intermountain has not alleged UDOT's acts resulted 
in a dangerous or defective condition on a highway and thus § 63-30-8 does not apply. See also 
Smithv. Weber Co. Sch.Disl,S77?2dl276,1279 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
15. Intermountain also cannot bring its tort claims under § 63-30-10.5, which applies 
when a governmental entity takes or damages private property for a public purpose. See Utah 
Code Ann.§63-30-10.5 (1) (1997). Intermountain has alleged a claim for inverse condemnation 
in its First Cause of Action, and § 63-30-10.5 does waive immunity for this claim. However, an 
express waiver of immunity for a government taking simply cannot be construed to include a 
waiver for negligence claims or intentional interference with economic relations claims. 
INTERMOUNTAIN'S INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIM 
16. Intermountain's inverse condemnation claim fails because the Utah Supreme Court 
has previously held that temporary denial of access to property does not constitute a taking. See 
e.g., Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459,465 (Utah 1989) 
(denying inverse condemnation claim for city's interference with access to store because 
temporary drainage system that interfered with access was not "permanent, continuous, or 
inevitably recurring"). 
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17. This Court finds that LntermountamYallegati 
temporarily denied Intermountain and its customers convenient access to the freeway fails to 
state an inverse condemnation claim under controlling Utah case law. 
INTERMOUNTAIN'S UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS CLAIM 
18. The Court also finds that Intermountain has not stated a claim sufficient to establish 
that UDOT's activities during the Project amounted to a violation of the Utah Constitution's 
Uniform Operation of Laws provision. 
19. Intermountain has not identified any law that UDOT has not applied uniformly. Nor 
has Intermountain alleged that UDOT discriminated against it because of its membership in an 
identifiable class. Intermountain has therefore failed to state a claim under Article 1, Section 24 
of the Utah Constitution. 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
20. The Court finds the factual allegations in Intermountain's complaint fail to state the 
elements of a contract claim. 
21. Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to establish the existence of a contract 
Notably absent are the establishment of offer, acceptance, consideration, or any terms of the 
agreement, 
22. The Court rejects Intermountain's argument that it has stated a quasi contract claim 
based on promissory estoppel. The facts Intermountain has alleged are insufficient to place this 
case outside the general rule that promissory estoppel cannot be asserted against the government. 
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BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
23. Intermountain's claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails 
because Intermountain has failed to allege facts sufficient to show it had a contract with 
Intermountain. * 
24. It is well settled that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to 
establish new rights and duties not agreed to by the parties. See, e.g., Bethany v. Nordstrom, 812 
P.2A 49 (Utah 1991). 
„•• , , H . : :.• '. : ORDER •• ." 
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS UDOT's motions to dismiss 
Intermountain's claims WITH PREJUDICE, the parties to bear their own costs. 
DATED this P day of U^xmJU^ , 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
WILLIAM B.BOHL 
Third District Court Ju 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the "2.U) day of November, 2003, a true, correct and complete 
copy of the foregoing was delivered upon the following attorneys as indicated below: 
Y\ U.S.Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight 
Steven C. Tycksen 
B.RayZoll 
ZOLL & TYCKSEN, L.C. 
5300 South 360 West, Suite 360 
Murray, UT 84123 
Def 
Facsimile 
No Service 
Jody K. Burnett 
Robert C Keller 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P O Box 45678 
Salt Lake City UT 84145-5678 
John Martinez 
2974 East St. Mary=s Circle 
Murray, UT 84108 
PLA 
Randy S. Hunter 
160 East 300 South 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857 
A 
± 
^ 
US. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight 
Facsimile 
No Service 
US Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight 
Facsimile 
No Service 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight 
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No Service 
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Steven C. Tycksen (#3300) 
B. Ray Zoll (#3607) 
ZOLL & TYCKSEN, L.C. 
5300 South 360 West, Suite 360 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801) 685-7800 
Facsimile: (801) 685-7808 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
g£ THIRD 
y ^ : s 2002 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SANDY DEPARTMENT 
Intermountain Sports, Inc. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION AND 
MURRAY CITY, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
(JURY DEMAND) 
Case No. 
Honorable 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Intermountain Sports, Inc. 
("Intermountain"), by and through its' attorneys, Zoll & Tycksen, and 
complains against the Defendants as follows: 
JURISDICTION, VENUE AND PARTIES 
1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
o o 
Venue of this claim is properly in this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-13-1, in that the cause of action arose in Salt 
Lake County, and the property at issue is located in Salt Lake 
County. 
Plaintiff Intermountain is a business operating in Murray, Utah as 
a recreational vehicle sales company. 
Defendant Murray City (the "City") is a municipal corporation 
organized pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah. 
Defendant Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") is an 
agency or instrumentality of the State of Utah. 
Intermountain has a right to sue the defendants pursuant to 
Article I, Sections 22 and 24 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 63-30-10.5 and 63-30-10, and other legal and equitable 
remedies. 
The claims alleged in this complaint arise in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
John Ash by ("Ash by") is the owner and operator of 
Intermountain located at 4225 South 500 West, Murray, Utah, 
2 
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on the west frontage road at 1-15 and north of 4500 South 
Street ("the Affected Property"). 
Intermountain has had a longstanding easement of access on the 
Affected Property/ giving it access to the 1-15 southbound off-
ramp to 4500 South and to 4500 South Street. The Affected 
Property is shown on the map attached hereto as Exhibit A and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
On July 14, 1997, Intermountain received a letter and flyer from 
Carol Provenzano with Wasatch Constructors giving open house 
meeting information and the beginning date, on or about August 
6, 1997, of the 1-15 Reconstruction Project. See Letter attached 
as Exhibit B. 
Upon information and belief, the open house meetings served 
only for information and instruction, not for hearing and meeting 
the needs of local businesses. 
Prior to construction, Ashby performed extensive due diligence to 
determine whether or not there would be little effect to his 
business from the Reconstruction Project. 
While serving as President of the 1-15 Coalition, a non-profit 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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group of business owners representing over 850 businesses 
along the freeway corridor, Ashby testified at a meeting 
addressing the Reconstruction Project at the request of Senator 
'Howell. - ,;—./, •••;• >>.-v-'-;. 
Ashby, acting for Intermountain Sports RV and the 1-15 
Coalition, contacted UDOT with respect to their plan for the 4500 
South interchange. In response to his query, he was provided a 
copy of a letter and drawing. These show a full closure of the 
Affected Property at the 4500 South interchange for a period of 
one year at the most. 
UDOT represented to Intermountain that the Affected Property 
would be closed for one year. 
UDOT officials met with business owners, including Ashby, and 
represented to said business owners that their concerns would 
be taken into consideration, but ho action was taken nor 
remuneration made for the anticipated taking of Intermountain's 
property rights. 
In direct reliance on the statements, representations and 
drawings of the City and UDOT, Intermountain did not pursue 
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action against UDOT or the City and has only now been able to 
determine its ascertainable damages, making its claims ripe for 
adjudication. 
18. After reconstruction of 1-15 began, traffic flow on 1-15, in the 
area of 4500 South Street, dropped two thirds from the traffic 
flow figures prior to the Reconstruction Project. 
19. In July 1997, UDOT began reconstruction on 1-15 effecting 4500 
South Street, by closing the off-ramp to the Affected Property. 
See Exhibit A. 
20. Access to the Affected Property was closed until December 1998, 
a period of 18 months instead of the 12 months promised by 
UDOT in its construction contract. 
21. The City and UDOT placed periodic closures on traffic at the 4500 
South Street off-ramp over the following 2 xh years. 
22. The State and City were effectively closing access to freeway 
exits and entrances, as well as access for East and West traffic at 
the 4500 South Street off-ramp, from July 1997 until May 2001, 
nearly a period of four years. 
23. The access provided by Defendants, in lieu of direct access off 
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the 4500 South off-ramp, involved a circuitous 2.5-mile loop (the 
"Circuitous Loop") (Attached as Exhibit WC") behind the Affected 
Property, which frustrated and eliminated potential customers. 
The Circuitous Loop was impractical and unreasonable for 
purposes of bringing prospective customers from the freeway to 
Plaintiff's business. Not only was the critical line of sight lost, 
but also the route was lengthy and confusing. 
24. Upon information and belief, the already significantly diminished 
number of potential customers from drive-by traffic, now 1/3 of 
what it was prior to re-construction, ended up getting lost and 
never arriving to Intermountain. 
25. The closure of the off-ramp, coupled with the change in 
configuration, denied reasonable access to the Affected Property 
and substantially damaged the value of Plaintiff's property in an 
amount to be proven at trial but currently calculated to be in 
excess of $2,000,000.00, 
26. The City constructed the Circuitous Loop in such a manner that 
other businesses obtained direct access to 4500 South off-ramp 
traffic, who otherwise benefited from the loss to Intermountain. 
6 
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27. Such action by the Defendants became tantamount to a taking of 
the property for the good of others and at the expense of 
Intermountain without just compensation. 
28. In the alternative, the City and/or UDOT, their agents, and 
employees who planned directed the traffic flow surrounding the 
Affected Property failed to exercise reasonable care, which 
directly resulted in the loss of business incurred by 
Intermountain. 
29. Further, UDOT, its employees, and agents failed to exercise 
reasonable care in the planning and execution of the 
reconstruction of 1-15 and the 4500 South Street interchange, 
which directly resulted in the loss of business incurred by 
Intermountain. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(INVERSE CONDEMNATION - UDOT & MURRAY CITY) 
30. Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 29 of the Complaint as if fully set forth 
herein. 
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In violation of § 63-30-10.5 of the Utah Code and Article I 
• • - • • < 
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, Defendants took or impaired 
Plaintiff's substantial property right for a public use without just 
compensation. M 
Upon information and belief, Defendants'determination to block 
and/or take the Plaintiff's easement of access over the Affected 
i 
Property, allowing access to the 1-15 Southbound off-ramp at 
4500 South and to 4500 South Street was based on a public 
purpose to expand 1-15 to reduce traffic impediments and safety ' 
concerns along 1-15, as well as enhancing the 4500 South off-
ramp. 
In closing the off-ramp and otherwise blocking and/or taking the 
Plaintiff's easement of access, Defendants substantially and 
materially impaired Plaintiff's right of access to the 1-15 off-ramp 
at 4500 South and to 4500 South Street as well as Plaintiff's 
customers' right of access to 4500 South Street and the Affected 
Property. 
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In blocking and/or taking the Plaintiff's easement of access over 
the Affected Property, Defendants substantially diminished the 
value of Plaintiff's private property. 
This injury to Intermountain was an unavoidable result of the 
City and UDOT's action and was continuous for a period of 
almost four years. 
Defendants' shutting down, blocking, and/or taking the Plaintiff's 
easement of access to the 1-15 Southbound off-ramp at 4500 
South and to 4500 South Street was damaging to Plaintiff's 
private property interest for a public use without just 
compensation. 
Plaintiff is entitled to actual, economic, special and compensatory 
damages to be proven at trial and believed to be at least 
$2,000,000.00. 
SECOND CAUSE Of* ACTION 
(DENIAL OF UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS -
UDOT & MURRAY CITY) 
Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 37 of the Complaint as if fully set forth 
herein. 
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The City and UDOT have discriminated against Plaintiff in 
violation of Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution, by, among 
other things, arbitrarily and capriciously providing other 
businesses with direct and beneficial access to 4500 South Street ..* 
and by configuring such access so as to direct traffic flow to 
those businesses, south of the Affected Property and north and 
west of the Affected Property, while at the same time refusing to 
offer such accommodations to Plaintiff who paid substantial taxes 
to the City and State and who relied on the City and UDOT's 
representations. 
The City's and UDOT's accommodation of other businesses and 
the diversion of traffic through State and Municipal regulations 
from the Affected Property towards those other businesses was 
unreasonable and was not for a legitimate legislative purpose. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH 
AND FAIR DEALING - UDOT & MURRAY CITY) 
Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs i through 40 of the Complaint as if fully set forth 
herein. 
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Defendant City and UDOT in determining to block and/or take 
Plaintiff's substantial property interest in the Affected Property, 
denying reasonable access to 1-15, and thereby stifling the 
commercial development in the area effectively destroyed or 
injured Intermountain's rights to receive its justified 
expectations. 
Plaintiff Intermountain has been seriously injured as a result of 
the City and UDOT's conduct in an amount to be proven at trial 
but currently calculated to be in excess of $2,000,000.00. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(NEGLIGENCE - UDOT & MURRAY CITY) 
Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 43 above as if fully set forth herein. 
Plaintiff alleges that in the planning and execution of the traffic 
flow surrounding the Affected Property the City and/or UDOT, 
their employees, and agents failed to exercise reasonable care 
when creating the circuitous route. 
Plaintiff further alleges that UDOT, its employees, and agents 
failed to exercise reasonable care in the planning, design, and 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
execution of the reconstruction of 1-15 and the 4500 South 
..interchange.. 
47. Upon information and belief, the Defendants negligently 
interfered with the contractual relationships and potential 
relationships Intermountain had with vendors and customers, by 
(1) causing vendors to discontinue doing business with 
Intermountain, (2) making it impossible for Intermountain to 
satisfy customers, and (3) jeopardizing the value of 
Intermountain's business. 
48. The Defendants have negligently and proximately, caused 
damages to Intermountain. Intermountain is entitled to 
damages in an amount to be proven at trial for the Defendants' 
Interference. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS -
UDOT AND MURRAY CITY) 
49. Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 48 above as if fully set forth herein. 
50. Upon information and belief, the Defendants intentionally 
interfered with the economic relationship Intermountain had with 
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its potential buyers, the buyers choosing to not come by the 
property and to not do any further business with Intermountain. 
Upon information and belief, the Defendants' interference was 
for an improper purpose, which was to have intermountain's 
customers and vendors avoid the property voluntarily and 
discontinue or avoid any business relationship with 
Intermountain. 
Upon information and belief/the Defendants' interference was by 
an improper means, as Defendants, contrary to law, requested 
that Intermountain and other businesses not bring claims against 
them and did not conduct condemnation hearings. 
The Defendants' interference was the proximate and immediate 
cause of Intermountain's economic injuries. Intermountain is 
entitled to damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(BREACH OF CONTRACT - UDOT) 
Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 53 above as if fully set forth herein. 
Defendant UDOT made representations to Intermountain that 
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the closed access to 1-15 at 4500 South would last one year. 
UDOT made representations to Intermountain that it would 
address the concerns of the local businesses along 1-15, 
Including those of Intermountain. 
Intermountain relied upon those representations and did not 
bring an action during the reconstruction of 1-15. 
Such forbearance, based on UDOT's representations and 
promises to address the needs of business owners, constituted 
consideration for that promise. 
Defendant UDOT breached this contract by never addressing the 
business' concerns, including those of Intermountain. 
UDOT further breached this contract by closing access to 1-15 at 
4500 South for a period of nearly four years, and not one year 
as represented to Intermountain by Defendant UDOT. 
Plaintiff Intermountain has been seriously injured as a result of 
the Defendant's conduct in an amount to be proven at trial but 
currently calculated to be in excess of $2,000,000.00. 
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
NOW THEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against the 
Defendants as follows: 
li On its First Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this 
Court award it damages in an amount to be proven at trial but 
calculated to be at least $2,000,000.00. 
2. On its Second Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this 
Court award it damages in an amount to be proven at trial but 
currently calculated to be in excess of $2,000,000.00. 
3. On its Third Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this 
Court award it damages in an amount to be proven at trial but 
currently calculated to be in excess of $2,000,000.00. 
4. On its Fourth Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this 
Court award it damages for the City and State's negligent 
interference with the contractual relationships Intermountain had 
and still has with its vendors as well the lost potential 
relationships with future customers and vendors in an amount to 
be proven at trial and calculated at $2,000,000.00. 
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5. On its Fifth Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this 
Court award it: damages for the Defendants' negligent and 
intentional interference with the prospective economic 
relationships Plaintiff had and still has with its buyers, in an 
amount to be proven at trial and calculated at $2,000,000.00. 
6. On its Sixth Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this 
Court award it damages in an amount to be proven at trial but 
currently calculated to be in excess of $2,000,000.00. 
7. For costs and attorney fees as allowed by law. 
8. For such other and further legal and equitable relief as the court 
may find just and proper. 
DATED and SIGNED this ^ " day of May 2002. 
ZOLL & TYCKSEN, L.C. 
B. RayZol'l/ • ~^~ ~ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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INTERSTATE 15 
July 14, 1997 RECONSTRUCTION 
Dear Resident or Business Owner . * 
On or around August 6, the I-15 Reconstruction Project will begin to affect residents, commuters and 
businesses using the 4500 South interchange. This action is one of many that make up the largest design-
build highway project in the United States. 
For you, it means planning your trips to address closure of I-I5 Southbound off-ramp at 4500 South and 
the 4500 South on-ramp to I-I5 Southbound. Bgft^o§i^j^%w^ 
Access to 4500 South from 1-15 Southbound 
* Exit at 3300 South and take State Street or Redwood Road 
* Exit at 5300 South and take State Street or Redwood Road 
. • » • • • • • • *.** « 
Access to Points South fromt 4500 South 
* Take State Street to 5300 South on-ramp to 1-15 Southbound 
•Take 4500South to 1-215 
An alternate for all North/South travel is 1-215. This roadway has been expanded to four lanes in each 
direction. The additional capacity and easy access to east/west surface streets makes this a good alternate 
to include in your trip planning. During 4500 South ramp closures, southbound ramps will remain open at 
3300 South and 5300 South. Ramps at 4500 South will re-open in approximately 12 months. 
Drivers can expect quicker and easier access; to and from I-15 when reconstruction is complete. Until 
construction is complete, staying informed is your key to getting through the 1-15 reconstruction with as 
little impact as possible to your schedule and your lifestyle. Call the information line at 888-1NFO-I15. 
Access die Web site at www.I-15.com. Find and use traffic reports in the local media. Consider changing 
your travel patterns by combining trips or talking with your employer about flex-time scheduling. Think 
about riding a bike, taking the bus to work or eliminating some trips altogether by telecommuting -you'll 
be reducing traffic (and your stress level!). . 
Included with this letter, is a flyer addressing issues specific to the 4500 South areas. Flyer information 
includes an announcement for business and community open house meetings. These meetings are an 
opportunity to obtain more information on planned closures, alternate routes, and project process and [ 
schedule - we hope you will come. 
Thank you in advance for your active participation. * 
AM^^ 
Carol Provenzano /I ~: ^ 
Business and Community Affii/s 
Program Manager 
Wasatch Constructors * Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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R O A D T O T H E F U T U R 
M< 
4500 South Interchange Ramp Closw 
The rcconsoxicaon of 4500 South interchange 
means quicker, easier access to and from 1-15. 
In addition to rebuilding bridge footings, the 
bridges themselves and expanding the decks, 
this intersection will be rebuilt with an' 
improved interchange. The new Single Point 
Urban Interchange (SPUD system will make 
**' traffic flow more effective and efficient. 
SEEING IS BELIEVING 
Reconstruction activities will bring with them 
barriers blocking closed ramps, detour signs 
and some increased truck traffic Working 
with construction impacts may be difficult at 
-• first, but driver planning and regular use of 
alternate mutes will make your trips easier: 
CLOSURE SCHEDULE 
August 6: 
M5 Southbound off-ramp to 4500 South. 
August 6; 
4500 South on-ramp to1-15 Southbound. 
East to west travel on 4500 South will remain 
open during ramp closures. Infrequent 
closures may be necessary during bridge 
removal activities - the community; affected 
business and services will be notified. The 
northbound on-and off-ramps will remain 
open dunng this approximately one-year 
closure. 
ALTERNATE ROUTES ^ 
Access to 4500 South from M5 Southbound 
Access to Points South from 4500 South 
• Take State Street to 5300 South on-ramp 
•lake 4500 South to i-215 
An alternate for all North/South travel is !• 
,215. This roadway has been expanded to four 
lanes in each direction. The additional 
capacity and easy access to ease/west surface 
streets makes this a good alternate to include 
in your trip planning. During 4500 South 
ramp closures, southbound-off ramps wiH 
remain open at 3300 Soudi and 5300 South. 
OPEN HOUSE MEETINGS 
Wasatch Constructors will host a series of 
Open House meetings focusing on upcoming ' 
ramp closures at 3300 and 4500 South. The 
meetings will give residents and businesses a 
chance to: 
• Learn about planned closures 
• View plans for the reconstructed 
interchange 
• Discuss communications plans 
• Review alternate route options 
continued on back.. 
Off-r&mp 
closed on 
approxfmatTy 
August 6th 
"^vTX 
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I--15 Reconstruction i urn 
480 North 2200 West 
Salt Lake City. UT 84116 
—. ** «* 
Information: Where to get it 
OPEN HOUSE MEETINGS: 
Business Open H o u s e s 
Monday, July 28 
12:00 -1:30 p.m. 
Quality Inn 
4465 Cencury Dc (450 W) 
Murray 
Wednesday, July 30 
12:00-1:30 p.m. 
Quality Inn 
4465 Century Dc (450 W) 
Murray 
Community Open Houses 
Tuesday July 29 
6 p.m. - 8 p.m. 
Woodrow Wilson Elementary 
2825 South 200 Ease 
South Salt Lake 
Thursday, July 31 
6 p.m.-8 p.m. 
Salt Lake Lutheran School ~ 
"PLAN ON IT" - STAY INFORMED 
Until construction is complete, staying 
informed is your key GO getting through the 
1-15 reconstruction with as little impact as 
possible to your schedule and your lifestyle. 
Read the newspaper and watch/listen'for traffic 
updates on radio and TV news. Tfou can access 
information sources at: 
Internet: www.I-15.com 
Tollfree: 1-888-INFO-I-15 
UDOT: 964-6000 (recorded information) 
QUESTIONS? -
U&satch Constructors 594-6400 
UDOTHSTeam 281-8167 
Cpnstmction Noise 322-2378 
For UDOT issues not directly relaced to the 
I-l5 Reconstruction Project, zeeaiss UDOTY 
Web site at www.sr.ex.state.ut.us and select the 
Road Conditions icon, or 
call UDOT ac 
965-4000. 
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- c * 4500 South Alternafe Routes 
Closed Ramps: 
14500 South southbound off-ramp 
4500 South- northbound on and off-ramps 
3300 South southbound on-ramp 
ipen Ramps: 
East/West Closure: 
• 4500 South between 500 West and 100 West 
(4500 South eastbound to 1-15 southbound remains open) 
Alternate East/West Routes: 
• 3900 South ;. 
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had no such law before. We have had 
nothing declaring this inequality, but 
they have been equal just the same. 
But there may a contingency arise in 
this country when this power, or rather 
this limitation upon the power of the 
state government, will be exceedingly 
dangerous. I think t h a t i t ought to be 
wiped ou t and left entirely to the Legis-
lature. . For t h a t reason I am in favor of 
the motion t o strike out. 
Mr. WELLS. Mr. Chairman, I desire 
to state—the gentleman has said t h a t 
this is the same proposition t h a t is in 
the s ta te of Wyoming. I will say t h a t 
it is also in North Dakota, Arkansas, 
Nebraska, South Dakota, Wisconsin— 
as many as t h a t and I don ' t know how 
many others. 
Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. Chairman, I 
would be in favor of the motion for 
this reason, t h a t there may come a 
time when the safety and defense of our 
government might require t h a t there 
should be a distinction between aliens 
and citizens, in regard t o holding prop-
erty, and I think t h a t i t can be safely 
left t o the Legislature. 
. The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, the 
motion of Mr. Varian, of Salt Lake, was 
to strike out section 21. Mr. Wells 
moves t o amend b y . striking out the 
word "resident" in line 2. 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, I 
raise a point of order on t h a t ; t h a t is 
not germane. 
The CHAIRMAN. If the point of 
order is raised, I shall have t o sustain 
it. 
The question was taken on the motion 
of Mr. Varian, and on division there 
were: ayes, 49, noes, 43. 
Section 21 was stricken out. 
Section 22 was read as follows: 
Section 22. Neither slavery nor invol-
un ta ry servitude, except as a punish-
ment for crime, whereof the pa r t y shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist in 
this State. 
t h a t the word "whereof' be s t r ide 
out and the words, ".of which' ' be sul 
st i tuted. 
Mr. EICHNOR. I think tha t is tlif 
language of the Constitution of tt | j 
United States. 
Mr. WELLS. Exactly. 
Mr. EICHNOR. I believe in adhering 
to the Constitution of the United Stat 
when we copy it. 
Mr. WHITNEY. I t is a hundre 
years old. 
The question being taken on t&l 
motion of Mr. Whitney, the amenili 
ment was rejected. M 
Section 23 was read as follows: 
Section 23. Private property shal 
no t be taken or damaged for public us | 
wi thou t just compensation. 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, 
move an amendment by adding tU 
words "first made / ' so t h a t his co 
pensation shall be made before tliepropl 
erty is taken. Tha t is in accord witS 
most of the constitutions. 
Mr. ROBERTS. Does t h a t mean h | 
fore the damage is done? 
Mr. THURMAN. No; I move to stritg 
out the words "or damaged. ' ' 
Mr. VARIAN. Mr. Chairman, I c s | 
for a division of that—there are t ^ 
motions. d§ | 
The CHAIRMAN. The chair will; 
vide the motion so t h a t the question.$|§ 
striking out "or damaged" will ftrstvfl 
voted upon. . 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Cha i rman^ 
would like to suggest to the gent lemSl 
* from Salt Lake, Mr. Varian, that irtp 
purpose in offering this .amen&nenfc#§| 
to provide for a compensation beiiigj 
made before the property is taken, 
the words "or damaged" are put^fi 
there t h a t cannot be very well det§f| 
mined. There ought to be a separal 
section covering the damage of t i l 
property. 
Mr. VARIAN. Mr. Chairman, I m 
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to strike out "or damaged" is a very 
material matter . I have taken pains 
to look a t it a little to-day in the late 
works on eminent domain, and I find 
it is put in other constitutions or stat-
utes to meet the entire case. In some 
states some courts have held t h a t dam-
age to property of a consequential kind 
was not necessarily within the meaning 
of the article of the constitution. For 
instance, I believe in Pennsylvania—I 
may have confounded the state—the 
question arose where an elevated road 
was erected upon a street and while it 
did not touch the property of the abut-
ting owner, did not destroy a brick, did 
not take a foot of his ground, it did af-
fect his use and occupation of his prem-
ises very disastrously.. I t affected the 
convenience of the inhabi tants of a 
house, and in this part icular case, fol-
lowing later, it was held t h a t there was 
no remedy. There was not the taking 
of the property. Now, the courts of 
New York went off in another direction 
; and it is finally settled in t h a t case tha t 
such injury as t h a t could be compen-
sated under the law of eminent domain. 
| To make it perfectly clear this word has 
been put in laws and constitutions, and 
^ the text-writers say t h a t i t is an equiv-
%: alent for any kind of injury of t h a t 
rk ind . 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, I 
I agree t h a t the compensation ought to 
%:.to be made, but the trouble would be to 
%;make it first in the case of a consequen-
t i a l damage. 
t Mr. FARR. I do no t see why. Take 
::-'a case like tha t . I t could be estimated. 
Jt.There could be no subsequent change; 
1-there is the railroad; there is the house; 
there are the windows; there is the 
| deprivation of light and air; there are 
all the necessary inconveniences of noise 
J^and soot and cinders, and disturbing 
g? the peace and rest of the family. Tha t 
"I can be compensated for just as well in 
knowledge of men and can be adduced 
before a jury. I do no t care how the? 
gentleman does it. I do n o t wish to be 
technical about it; I would like to see 
those words, "or damaged," kept in 
some way. 
I hope those words, "o r diamaged," 
will remain in t h a t section. I do no t 
wish to argue the point, b u t I can see 
in a great many instances where i t 
would be very important . For instance, 
on a sidewalk, a person owning land; 
they dig down a bank t eno r fifteen feet, 
and damage t h a t lot t o a great extent. 
I think the man should be remunerated 
for the damage done t o his lot. I move 
t h a t those words remain in t h a t section 
if they possibly can remain there. 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, my 
objectiou to the words "or damaged" 
is the utter impracticability of pro-
viding for compensation before the 
damage is done. Now, I will cite an 
instance familar to a grea t many. A 
few years ago people in Salt Lake 
County placed some boards in a dam 
here a t the point of the mountain: 
they had a right to do t h a t if they did 
n o t damage anybody and I don ' t sup-
pose they thought they would damage 
anybody, a t the sam.e time they did it: 
.but the result w^as t h a t a great many 
people in Utah County were damaged, 
after the act which caused the damage. 
Now, in a case of t h a t kind how would 
compensation be made before the act 
was done which caused the damage? 
Damage is not always—in fact is not 
often contemplated or expected. I t 
comes unlooked for as the consequence 
of an act which the pa r t y performs. 
Consequently it seems t o me t h a t as t o 
t ak ing property by the law of eminent 
domain they should have the right t o 
t ake it when they pay for it, if the ne-
cessity for taking it exists. As regards 
damaging it, why, i t ought to be paid 
for as soon as the damage can be ascer-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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understand the gentleman correctly, 
from Utah County, he would be in 
i avor of striking out the words, -"or 
d a m a g e d . " Gentlemen, I hope this 
amendment will prevail. Jus t for the 
very reason t h a t the gentleman from 
Weber County said i t should be in the 
Constitution. Take a city like Salt 
Lake, where grading is required, or any 
other city where grading is required, 
and you will bankrupt those cities if 
you place this in the Constitution. 
Every man t h a t owns property in the 
street—the street will be graded and 
one or t w o or three people will claim 
damages and the result will be it will 
bring the municipalities into court. 
Mr. VARIAN. Would no t the com-
pensation benefit always allowed in a 
case of t h a t kind more than equalize 
the damage? 
Mr. EICHNOR. The law is unsettled 
a t present in regard to the grading of 
streets whether they can secure dam-
ages; it would simply bankrupt Salt 
Lake City, I tell you tha t , gentle-
men, if y^u place this in the Consti-
tu t ion . 
Mr. PIERCE. Mr. Chairman, I am 
in favor of retaining the words "or 
damaged." I recollect a spectacle a few 
years ago of .grading, in Sal t Lake City. 
There was a certain street—I believe it 
w a s Sta te street—the grade had been 
established for some years, and the city 
came in and established a different grade 
and built the street up some ten feet 
higher than property abut t ing on it. 
There is a spectacle where they could 
n o t get any damages for it, and the 
s treet as it was built absolutely de-
stroyed the value of their property and 
they could not get a cent for that . I 
say t h a t i t ought to be fixed so t h a t 
the city must adjust the grade for the 
accommodation of people t h a t own 
property along a certain street and 
t h a t is the reason t h a t I am anxious 
read a line or t w o from Lewis in hisll 
work upon Eminent Domain: 
"When the people of Illinois revisedl 
their constitution in 1870, they intro-f 
ducecl an important change into the! 
provision respecting the power of erni-) 
nent domain. The provision reads as'? 
follows: 'Private property shall not be" 
taken or damaged for public use without) just compensation.' Every other state? 
which has revised its constitution since I 
1870, except North Carolina, which^ 
never had any provision on the subject,; 
has followed the example set by Illinois 
by adding the word 'damaged' or i ts ; 
equivalent to the provision in question.'rj. 
And the question not only refers to 
street grades in cities, but refers to 
grades of railway property. For in-
stance, it is unfair t h a t a railroad should 
run right next to a man's front door or 
almost next to his front door, and tha t 
his property should be destroyed or 
half the value taken away without 
making some compensation for t ha t 
property which is really not reached, 
as no par t of the property is taken; 
t h a t is, the par t of the property tha t is 
damaged; and I say I am in favor of 
being liberal in eminent domain act, but. 
whenever we g ran t this liberty to cor-
porations in any way—public or private 
corporations, we should make thempay^ 
for whatever they take, and I believe 
the words "or damaged" should remain 
in the Constitution. 
Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I a m | 
opposed to the motion t o strike out the; 
words "or damaged." I believe, as has; 
been said already in this discussion,^ 
t h a t when the public use a man's prop-
erty or make an improvement tha t vhv 
•tually destroys the use of t h a t property,; 
t h a t they should pay for it as much as' 
if the property itself were taken. Of; 
course, as has been suggested by the ; 
gentleman from Salt Lake, whatever 
benefit results by reason of this im-
provement is set off against the damage 
t h a t is caused, and in t ha t way t h e . ^ 
m 
O.T. ^ 4- 4-V. ^ ,-v W./1 ~ i i v^ ~ 1^ . v 1^ » J ~1 1 -3 1- . 1~ 11 - J 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
March 25. BILL OF RIGHTS. 329 
raising of a grade or by the lowering of 
a grade or by any other kind of im-
provement t o injure private property 
and because they don ' t actually enter 
upon and t ake the property itself, 
although they do destroy the use of 
the property, t h a t they should be liable 
for damage; I think it is unjust and 
unfair and I am therefore opposed to 
this motion. 
Mr. RALEIGH. Mr. Chairman, I pro-
pose a slight amendment, "Pr iva te 
property shall no t be taken for public 
use or damage wi thou t just compensa-
tion first be made." Simply a recon-
struction of t he section, t h a t is all.' 
The CHAIRMAN. The chair rules 
t h a t t h a t would be a proper question 
on revision and compilati on. 
Mr. THUBMAN. Mr. Chairman, I 
will wi thdraw the motion to amend as 
far as "or damaged" is concerned if it is 
not objected to . 
Mr. PIERCE. Mr. Chairman, I don ' t 
think t h a t 'first made" should be put 
in there. If I recollect the s t a tu te cor-
rectly now, whenever a corporation is 
permitted t o enjoy the benefits of the 
eminent domain act and desires to take 
property a t all, before they can do it 
they have t o apply t o the court* and it 
is within the discretion of the court to 
fix a bond and require good sureties 
before t h a t property is taken, and I 
believe it should be left to the Legisla-
ture as to how it shall be taken. This 
is simply a declaration of principles 
t h a t it shall no t be taken. The Legis-
lature can require any corporation 
either private or public, to put up a 
bond before they t ake anybody's pr< >p-
erty or damage it, wi thout any consti-
tutional provision. 
Mr. CREER. Mr. Chairman, I am in 
favor of the motion of the gentleman 
from Utah, t h a t the amendment shaJl 
be added to the section for the reason 
t h a t no twi ths tanding the gentleman 
from Salt Lake savs comDensation ma.v 
erty has been taken and the pa r ty dis-
possessed and t h a t the property be liti-
gated for for considerable length of time 
and the pa r t y kept out of possession, 
no twi ths tand ing there may be a bond 
there, and a t the same time probably he 
would have t o sue upon the bond 
afterwards. I think it is a very s t rong 
proposit ion anyway to give the public 
a r ight t o dispossess a private person of 
his proper ty summarily and i t seems t o 
me he ought t o be compensated before 
t h a t is done, because he may be pu t t o 
a grea t inconvenience and loss of time. 
He may have t o sue even upon the bond 
after he should vindicate his rights in 
the court. Therefore, I am in favor 
t h a t if t h a t should be requh-ed, he 
should be first compensated before his 
proper ty is taken. 
Mr. GOODWIN. Mr. Chairman, I do 
no t believe the committee can pass 
such an amendment. Emergencies may 
arise when i t would be simply impos-
sible to carry it out. W h a t there 
ought t o be is a law (and t h a t belongs 
t o the Legislature) to compel fair t reat-
ment both ways . I t is t rue t h a t rail-
road companies have had the r ight .of 
way, and they own and have owned 
for th i r ty years where they have gone 
through. I t is-lust\-a»-t^ueijltat^if-- you 
t ry to build a railroad through some 
back street in Provo, or up t o some 
mining camp, you would find your-
self confronted wi th the most ridiculous 
proper ty values you ever heard of, and 
every m a n in t h a t town t h a t you would 
get as an appraiser would raise the 
price. I t is all r ight as i t is; let the 
Legislature fix i t sometime within a 
year t h a t the property shall be paid for 
and t h a t the p a r t y taking the property 
shall give ample bonds. In this bill of 
r ights i t is simply foolish t o pu t some-
thing t h a t cannot be executed, because 
emergencies would arise in the mines, 
in the cities, and in the fields, where Digitize  by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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i t exactly, and I say t h a t if I don ' t 
adopt this method—if you adopt the. 
other method, then you pu t a block in 
the way of progress and of develop-
ment in this country, and in this new 
State, t h a t the people of the State do 
not w a n t to have there; t h a t is w h a t I 
say. I instanced i t in the very example 
I have stated. I can point t o cases now 
t h a t are pending in the district court 
in this district t h a t have been pending 
there over a year—just such cases as I 
am speaking of where companies have 
entered upon the property of people, 
who refused to enter into negotiations 
with them or t o agree w.ith them on a 
fair compensation for t h a t property; 
they entered upon i t and gave their 
bonds, and from t h a t day t o this the 
court has not reached t h a t case and 
they haven't been able t o litigate it. 
Now, would you say t h a t railroad 
should not have been constructed—that 
t h a t public improvement, whatever i t 
might be, ought no t t o be made. Why, 
if you say that , you will n o t have rail-
roads, and many other public improve-
ments will not be made, for the reason, 
as I have stated, t h a t when men enter 
into these undertakings t h a t involve 
the expenditure of large amounts of cap-
ital, they do it because the time is ripe 
when they enter iipbii t h e . enterprise 
for the accomplishment of it , and if they 
cannot accomplish i t within a reason-
able time, if they have g o t t o wai t t w o 
or three years before they can commence 
the construction of the road, they are 
no t goijig to build a railroad, they are 
no t going to project it. For t h a t 
reason, I say I am opposed to i t and I 
say t h a t the individual has ample pro-
tection, when the owner of the property 
and the company t h a t desires to take 
i t cannot agree upon its value and upon 
the damage t h a t will be incurred, and a 
sufficient bond is pu t up, as soon as the 
mat ter is determined he gets his money. 
Mr. JAMES. Mr. Chairman, I hope 
up before this Convention t h a t will be 
of greater importance t o i t t han the one 
t h a t is being discussed r ight now. I am 
heartily in accord, Mr. Chairman, wi th 
the remarks of the gentleman who has 
just been on the floor, Mr. Richards; I 
don ' t believe we can afford in this Con-
vention to take t h a t mat te r out of the 
hands of the Legislature. I am in 
favor of the Legislature meeting and 
arranging how this shall be done. I say 
t h a t we can afford to be as liberal as 
the great s ta te of Illinois. There is a 
s t a t e t h a t is almost one solid garden. 
I t is said t h a t there is no t one point in 
the s ta te of Illinois t h a t is ten miles 
from a railroad. Now, w h a t do they 
do? They leave it t o the Legislature, 
and as it has been read on this floor 
already during this debate, they simply 
say t h a t damages and compensation 
shall be allowed by a jury or fixed by 
t i e state. They leave i t to the Legis-
la ture . Now, why cannot we be as 
liberal as they are? Mi\ Chairman, I 
can tell you why we cannot be more 
liberal than they are, for the very reason 
t h a t the lands t h a t our railroads are 
built over into this grea t vast desert 
country are far less valuable than they 
are in the s ta te of Illinois. 
This is a country of the most difficult 
kind t o build railroads and maintain 
them in. We have long hauls, and the 
mos t heavy grades t h a t are to be 
found anywhere in the world, and in 
order to build railroads we must give 
them an opportunity and a fair show. 
Now, the gentlemen t h a t are familiar 
wi th the construction of railroads 
through these canyons and these moun-
ta ins all know w h a t the builder of a 
rai lroad has to contend with. I have 
seen it myself, within twenty-five miles 
of this town. I have seen a railroad 
blockaded for three months and our 
men behind their breastworks to pre-
vent t h a t railroad from passing over a 
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even if they say they shall have just 
compensation, wi thou t some manner 
t o he indicated how t h a t compensation 
shall he arrived a t , I think t h a t the 
r ights of the individual will he infringed 
upon as the experience of the pas t has 
shown t h a t they have been infringed 
upon . I am in favor of the amendment 
of the substitute. 1 should have liked 
t o have seen it d rawn a little farther 
and provide how the farmer whose 
r ight is taken from him should he com-
pensated. I find t h a t in California, 
Colorado and other s ta tes , t h a t in 
their constitutions they have provided 
t h a t the amount shall be paid into 
cour t for the owner before the right of 
w a y shall be appropriated. They have 
also provided, in some states , for a jury 
or a number of commissioners t o decide 
w h a t the damage or the compens.ation 
shall be before ever the right of w a y 
accrues. I think t h a t t h a t is just. I t 
is humane, and I don ' t think any law 
ought to compel the farmer or the citi-
zen t o litigate for his natural , inalien-
able and indefeasible rights, and I think 
a r ight of property is just as useful, just 
as good, and just as near t o the indi-
vidual in many cases as life itself, for 
life is dependent upon those rights of 
property. I am in favor of the amend-
ment or the substitute; I don ' t care 
which prevails, as I believe either will 
arrive a t the point t h a t we wish to see 
obtained. 
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I 
a m surprised a t many gentlemen here 
in their remarks t h a t they have made. 
We must have a very wicked p e o p l e -
people t h a t own little pieces of land 
where the rai lway companies go 
through—and very holy, just, and 
righteous railway corporations. I t 
mus t be all in favor of the corporation 
and nothing in favor of the people. 
Now, I believe people have rights, and 
we are here t o protect the rights of the 
majority of the people and all the 
RIGHTS. March 25. 
the other side, t h a t if we w a n t this 
Constitution voted for we must protect 
the rights of the masses, even if i t does 
n o t suit the righteous corporations. 
Mr. MURDOCK (Wasatch). Inasmuch 
as this discussion has got down t o the 
laymen, I feel t h a t I ought to say a 
word or two, inasmuch as I disagree 
wi th the gentlemen t h a t have spoken 
upon the question. As i t has been 
s ta ted by our legal men, the laws of 
Utah make provisions for damage t o 
part ies who are injured by rai lroads 
and by other corporations passing over 
their lands. I think we can safely t r u s t 
this t o the Legislature to protect the 
man, t o protect private individuals 
from corporations trespassing upon 
them, bu t I think t h a t if this substi tute 
of the amendment prevails i t will place 
an obstruction in the way no t only of 
railroads, but of enterprises like irriga-
t ion companies. In my short experience, 
had this law been the law wi thou t any 
other legislation, i t certainly would 
have stopped several irrigation com-
panies from building their canals for 
three or four years, long enough to 
have prohibited the owners of the land 
from raising enough grain to have paid 
the expenses of building those canals. 
Now, I am opposed t o the substi tute 
and t o the amendment, and I t r u s t 
t h a t this committee will vote them 
down, and t h a t we will leave i t in the 
hands of the Legislature of this future 
S ta te t o make such laws t h a t shall he 
necesssary for the protection of prop-
erty owners. 
Calls for the question. 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. Chairman, 1 
don ' t know whether this committee 
desires t o hear me or not. I made this 
niotion and have no t had a single 
chance t o speak t o it . I made i t in 
good faith, I believe t h a t the r ight of 
property is a sacred right, and no mat-
ter if i t is the widow's mite, I believe 
t h a t the man who owns just one little 
I«™K Vioa insst a.s much riffht to 
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graze on a thousand hills; having a 
sacred and absolute r ight to his prop-
erty, having paid for i t and the com-
pany owner; i t may be his home—it 
may be all he has and the proposition 
here now advanced is t h a t a railroad 
company may come along and stake 
out this lot and tell hirn t o get off and 
awai t the slow process of the law in 
litigation; and we know what i t is 
when you come to litigation with the 
railroad company; they just simply 
have the advantage a t every turn. 
They have their a t torneys paid by the 
year; they have money to bring for-
ward all the witnesses they want , and 
to secure every advantage ' tha t the law 
possibly gives. And if delay is of any 
benefit t o them in t h a t case they insist 
on the delay and they get it. In the 
meantime, the man is deprived of his 
property, his home is taken away from 
him, and because his home is only a 
mat ter of three or four hundred dol-
lars—it did not amount to much any-
way as the gentleman from Salt Lake 
in front of me here intimated, very 
much in the language of a corpora-
tion attorney-—it w^s n o t worth any-
thing anyway—land t h a t was n o t 
wor th a cent. Now, the facts are, 
gentlemen, t h a t this proposition will 
no t retard the development of the 
country. I t will no t .retard the 
progress of the country, but as sug-
gested by one of the gentlemen on this 
floor if railroad companies understood 
t h a t they must determine this compen-
sat ion in advance, they will see to it 
t h a t instead of ceaseless and endless 
litigation, they will be anxious to bring 
their cases to the front, if it comes to a 
case, and have them disposed of, and if 
a man does ask them w h a t they may 
think is a little bit extraordinary in 
its terms, had no t they better, in view 
of the fact t h a t they had this extraor-
dinary right t o take away a man's 
property, wi thout his consent—had no t 
their work, t han to have the poor man 
kept wi thout the use of his property 
and sitting by and seeing another m a n 
reveling in the possession of it, while he 
has not anything in return for it? Now, 
Mr. Chairman, I am about as much 
surprised as my colleague from U t a h 
County t o hear men talking just as if 
this provision of the l aw which s tands 
to-day in two-thirds of the modern 
constitutions in the United States w a s 
an innovation here. As if the progress 
of the whole country was going t o be 
stopped, because we w a n t to get into 
the Constitution a provision which 
says t h a t before a person using the 
power of the Sta te can take from a 
man the property t h a t belongs to him 
he must first pay for it. I say there 
are two-thirds of them. I will n o t 
take the time to read the clauses in the 
various constitutions, but nearly all 
the modern constitutions provide t h a t 
this payment must be made in advance; 
and I believe the constitution in the 
s ta te of Washington has been referred 
t o more than any constitution in the 
United States—has been referred t o 
more by members on this floor t h a n 
any other constitution, and I am going 
t o read t h a t pa ragraph as it will only 
take a moment: ;.''••. 
Private property shall not be taken 
for public use, except for private ways 
of necessity, and for drains, flumes, or 
ditches, on or across the lands of others 
for agricultural, domestic, or sani tary 
purposes. No private property shall 
be taken or damaged for public or 
private use wi thout just compensation 
having been first made or paid into 
court for the owner, and no right of 
w a y shall be appropriated to the use of 
any corporation other than municipal, 
until full compensation therefor be first 
made in money or ascertained and paid 
paid into cour t for the owner. 
Now, I ask w h a t could be more just 
t han tha t? T h a t is all t h a t is de-
manded in this, and gentlemen, i t does 
seem to me for the protection of the 
individual as against corporations we 
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manipulations and negotiations 
^jx order to secure the money for the en-
terprise, but if men who desire t o en-
i in business enterprises see this pro-
vision in our Constitution and see t h a t 
Jjfrey can not go upon an individual's 
jfand wi thout first paying for it, would 
|aot it have a tendency to retard th is 
progress which we all so much desire? I 
t h a t the corporation ought t o se-
fare the individual for the value of his 
land, but I say the Legislature has al-
ready done t h a t and i t always will do 
3t, and if in the good judgment of the 
people who compose the next Legisla-
ture, they deem it necessary and proper 
bo require payment first to be made, let 
lem do it, but let us no t put a rigid, 
nyielding thing of this kind in our 
ins t i tu t ion , which is so hard t o 
limend. Leave it as i t has been left 
other states. Leave it as i t is left 
the Constitution of the United 
States. Tha t is a good model wi th re-
j e c t to a mat ter of this kind, and I do 
believe t h a t any injury would result 
n it. 
|Mr. SQUIRES. Mr. President, I would 
to ask t h a t this section and the fol-
w7- • Mwing section, 23, pass over wi thou t 
Jtction for the present, and for this rea-
Mr. Varian informed me on yester-
Tday t h a t he had been making a care-
iiexamination of this subject and he 
^Satisfied t ha t the action already taken 
fi section 23 is in violation of the l a w 
[eminent domain. 
|The PRESIDENT. No question a b o u t 
jMr. SQUIRES. And the proposition 
J§hich he has, I presume would be t o 
%ike out one of these sections and 
•|ve the t w o sections consolidated, 
for t h a t reason and in his absence, 
||vrould like to have the Convention 
'§ss over these t w o sections, or further 
Consideration of them, for the present. 
jMr. EVANS (Weber). Mr. President, 
for private use. I understand he is pre-
paring an argument on it. 
Mr. SQUIRES. He might w a n t t o 
strike out one and amend the other. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). No; he talked 
t o me about it. 
The proposed amendment of Mr. 
Evans w a s read. 
Mr. PIERCE. Are you going to p u t 
in the words, " o r damaged?" 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). I am willing t o 
as far as I am concerned. 
Mr. PIERCE. Well, I am in favor of 
the motion with those words in. 
Mr. ELDREDGE. With the consent 
of the gentleman I would suggest i t read 
as follows: "Pr iva te property shall n o t 
be taken or damaged for public or pri-
• vatei ise wi thou t just compensation," 
and leave all the balance to the Legisla-
ture. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Section 23 pro-
vides t h a t it shall not be taken o r 
damaged. 
Mr. KIMBALL (Weber). Mr. Presi-
dent, I offer this as a substi tute for 
section 22: 
Pr iva te proper ty shall not be taken 
for public use, or damaged, w i t h o u t 
just compensation as determined by a 
jury, which shall be paid as soon as i t 
can be ascertained and before posses-
sion is taken. No benefit which m a y 
accrue t o the owner as a result of an 
improvement made by any private cor-
porat ion shall be considered in fixing-
the compensation for property taken o r 
damaged. 
Mr. THURMAN. Mr. President, if 
any of these proposed amendments 
prevail, I hope i t will be the last one-
proposed. There is something in t h a t 
t h a t has the t rue ring. I cannot s a y 
t h a t I am exactly in full sympa thy 
wi th i t t o the extent t o which i t goes, 
but, gentlemen, this is a serious question 
we are dealing wi th . There is nothing: 
more sacred than the r ight of property r 
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over the s t raw again t h a t was threshed 
in committee of the whole. Tha t is 
right. These men have a right to do 
tha t , bu t in the committee of the whole 
the vote was , very emphatic and it was 
overwhelming t h a t if this principle of 
the right of the public by the s trong a rm 
of the law was to be exercised to the ex-
tent of taking a man's property away 
from him, i t is as little as"the public could 
be expected to do t o pay the owner of 
the property in .advance. Now, t o 
show t h a t I do not wish enterprises t o 
be obstructed or s tubborn men to have 
the chance to annoy, harass, or pre-
vent them, I do not care how summary 
the proceedings may be provided by 
law as long as it is an impart ial method 
by which the compensation may be 
ascertained, but I say let i t be ascer-
tained and the par ty who proposes to 
take the x>roperty be compelled to pay 
for i t before possession is taken. If the 
ordinary course of the l aw is too tedious 
and too slow and m a y retard private 
^enterprises, I , do not care if you make 
a summary method by which a jury of 
three men may be picked up from the 
neighborhood of the owner—men ac-
-quainted*with the property, and let them 
appraise the value, and when they have 
^appraised the value, demand t h a t pay-
ment be made in advance or hands off. 
No mat te r who it is, no mat ter how 
grand and how mighty and how all 
pervading the power may be t h a t pro-
poses to lay its hands upon the prop-
erty of the individual, I say compel it 
to pay for the privilege, or hands off. 
Has it come to pass t h a t here in free 
America we a t tach less importance 
t o this t han they did in old England a 
hundred years ago? Why, if I were an 
eloquent man, I might repeat t o you 
the words of Lord Chatham, spoken 
Upon the floor of the house of commons 
when he says, "The poorest man in his 
cottaire may bid defiance to all the 
here we propose to give a railroad cof.3 
porat ion, and I speak of that , because! 
the trouble always is with those 
'Mr. JAMES'. May I ask Mr. Thurmar 
a question? Do you know in the laaiH 
fifteen years in Utah Territory whertfl 
the railroads have taken a piece ofl 
property from any individual and not! 
paid for it? 
Mr. THURMAN. Yes, sir. 
Mr. JAMES. Would you name aj 
case? 
Mr. THURMAN. I will name the in-
stance. 
Mr. JAMES. Will you name the com-
pany and the case? 
Mr. THURMAN. Yes, I will ; name^ 
the company; I do no t suppose it will-
be giving away secrets. '$ 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Without the 
consent of the owner, Mr. Thurman? ; * 
Mr. THURMAN. Why, of course W 
was wi thout the consent of the owner." 
I will name an instance under the law; 
which exists in the Territory of Utah! 
to-day, in which a man was cited to; 
appear in court and have the question:! 
of the^necessity of taking the property^ 
determined and also appraise the value* 
of it. Tha t corporation had offered the! 
man $300 for his property. They weril 
willing to pay him $300 and rather: 
t han go to law he offered to take $80$ 
for his property, though protesting all: 
the time t h a t it was wor th more thai* 
tha t . At last when we reached a juryf 
the jury gave the man $1500 for his; 
property. There was this righteous^ 
corporation t h a t my friend from Utah 
County referred to the other day, and^ 
this same question, when the committee 
of the whole overwhelmingly voted to: 
place this measure in the article as we; 
find it here. There was the righteous-
corporation exercising a power under d 
constitutional law. In t ha t case itl 
was unconstitutional. 
Mr. RICHARDS. Will the gentleman 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Filed eight copies of the foregoing, one containing an original signature, as well 
as a CD containing an electronic version of the same in WordPerfect format, with the Clerk 
of the Utah Court of Appeals: 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE COURT 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET, FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84114-0230 
and served two copies of the foregoing upon the following: 
Attorney for Defendant Utah Department of Transportation 
Randy S. Hunter 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
via first class mail, postage pre-paid, this Jg?i day of May, 2004, addressed as set forth 
above. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
